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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution guarantees to everyone the right to just 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. The 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”) was promulgated 
to give effect to give effect to this fundamental right as envisaged in s 33(3) of 
the Constitution. 
 
Section 32 of the Constitution also guarantees to everyone the right of access to 
information. The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (“PAIA”) 
was promulgated to give effect to this fundamental right as contemplated in s 
32(2) of the Constitution. 
 
This thesis considers the extent to which the provisions of PAJA may be 
applicable to the actions of the South African Legal Practice Council (“the 
LPC”). It also considers the extent to which the provisions of PAIA may be 
applicable to the records of the LPC. 
 
Some remedial legislative amendments to the provisions of both PAJA and 
PAIA are recommended with the view of addressing certain identified legal 
obstacles. The proposed legislative amendments will enhance the exercise, 
realisation, enforcement and protection of both the right to just administrative 
action and the right of access to information. 
iv  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction  1 
2. Background to the Study  7 
3. Problem Statement  9 
4. Scope and Objectives of the Study  13 
5. Methodology of Research  14 
6. Description of Chapters  14 
CHAPTER 2: APPLICABILITY OF PAJA TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL 
1. Introduction   16 
2. Substantive Requirements for the Applicability of PAJA   16 
3. Is the LPC Subject to PAJA?   18 
4. Decision Adversely Affecting Rights   24 
5. Direct, External Legal Effect Decision   26 
6. Lawful, Reasonable and Procedurally Fair Administrative Decision 29 
6.1 Lawful Administrative Action   30 
6.2 Reasonable Administrative Action   31 
6.3 Procedurally Fair Administrative action   32 
7. Conclusion   33 
CHAPTER 3: APPLICABILITY OF PAIA TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL 
1. Introduction   35 
2. Section 32(1) of the Constitution   37 
3. The Importance of the Right of Access to Information   38 
4. Distinction between a Public Body and a Private Body   40 
5. Is the LPC a Public or Private Body?   42 
6. Applicability of PAIA to the LPC as a Public Body   45 
7. Applicability of PAIA to the LPC as a Private Body    46 
8. Application of Mandatory and Discretionary Grounds of Refusal of Access 
v  
 to Information    48 
9. Third Parties ‘Access to the Records of the LPC   50 
10. Conclusion    51 
 
 
1. 
 
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction   
 
 
54 
2. LPC as an Organ of State for purposes of PAJA   54 
3. Administrative Actions of the LPC      55 
4. LPC as a Public or Private Body for purposes of PAIA    56 
5. Justification of Requests for Access to Information    57 
6. Legal Obstacles    57 
7. Recommendations   59 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY   
 
61 
1  
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
South Africa is a democratic country with a Constitution1 and a Bill of Rights2 
that confers numerous fundamental human rights. The right to just administrative 
action3 and the right of access to information4 are among these fundamental 
human rights. These two fundamental human rights, which have respectively 
been given effect to by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (“PAJA”)5 
as envisaged in s 33(3) of the Constitution6, and Promotion of Access to 
Information Act 2 of 2000 (“PAIA”)7, as contemplated in s 32(2) of the 
Constitution8, are the focus of this dissertation, specifically their applicability to 
the South African Legal Practice Council (“the LPC”). 9 Stated differently, this 
dissertation examines the applicability of the constitutional right of access to 
information, which has been given effect to by PAIA, to the records of the LPC. 
It also examines the applicability of the constitutional right to just administrative 
action, which has been given effect to by PAJA, to the decisions of the LPC. 
 
 
 
 
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (“the Constitution”). 
2 Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
3 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
4 Section 32 of the Constitution. 
5 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
6 Section 33(3) of the Constitution requires national legislation to be enacted to give effect to the 
fundamental human right to just administrative action. It requires the legislation so enacted to – 
(a) Provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, and 
independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) Impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsection (1) and (2). The rights 
mentioned in subsec (1) are the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. The right mentioned in subsec (2) is the right conferred to everyone whose 
rights have been negatively affected by administrative action to be given written reasons; and 
(c) Promote an efficient administration. 
7 Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
8 Section 32(2) requires national legislation to be enacted to give effect to the fundamental human right 
of access to information. It requires the legislation so enacted to provide for reasonable measures to 
alleviate the administrative and financial burden on the state. 
9 The LPC is a statutory body established in terms of s 4 of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 (“the 
LPA”). 
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The LPC is the regulatory and controlling body of the legal profession in South 
Africa. It replaced the four Law Societies10 and has taken over the regulation and 
control of the attorneys’ profession from the four Law Societies, as well as the 
control and regulation of the advocates’ profession from the Bar Councils with 
effect from 1 November 2018. 
 
The interdependence between the right of access to information and the right to 
just administrative action was eloquently explained in Aquafund (Pty) Ltd v 
Premier of the Western Cape where the court stated that “... a person must be 
entitled to such information as is reasonably required by him to determine 
whether his right to lawful administrative action has been infringed or not. If a 
person is not able to establish whether his rights have been infringed, he will 
clearly be prejudiced.”11 This is the main reason for the combination of these two 
rights in this dissertation. 
 
A remedy of judicial review is available for the judicial enforcement and 
protection of the constitutional right to just administrative action 12 and the 
constitutional right of access to information. 13 Thus these two constitutional 
rights are justiciable in the sense a person who feels that his or her rights have 
been violated, is entitled to approach a court or any other independent and 
impartial tribunal for appropriate relief.14 Appropriate relief may only be granted 
if a violation of any right is found to have occurred. 
 
In examining the applicability of the constitutional right to just administrative 
action, the substantive requirements for the applicability of this right, including 
the availability of a remedy of judicial review for the judicial enforcement and 
protection of this right against the decisions of the LPC, will be explained. These 
substantive requirements are that (a) the organization must be subject to the 
 
10 The four Law Societies established in terms of s 56 of the Attorneys Act, as amended by s 21 of the 
Attorneys Amendment Act 40 of 2014, were The Cape Law Society; The Law Society of the Free State; 
The Law Society of the Northern Provinces and The Kwa-Zulu Natal Law Society. 
11 Acquafund (Pty) Ltd v Premier of the Western Cape 1997 (7) BCLR 907 (C) at 916. 
12 In terms of s 6 of PAJA judicial review proceedings may be instituted by any person in a court or a 
tribunal for the judicial review of an administrative action. 
13 The right to institute judicial review proceedings in a court of law for an appropriate relief in regard 
to the constitutional right of access to information is provided in s 78 of PAIA. 
14 W Freedman Understanding the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1ed (2013) 22. 
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provisions of PAJA, and (b) the decision challenged must qualify as 
“administrative action” as defined in s 1 of PAJA. 
 
The definition of what constitute “administrative action” in terms of s 1 of PAJA 
distinguishes between an organ of state when exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of any legislation15, or a natural or juristic 
person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or 
performing of performing a public function in terms of an empowering 
provision16, among the other elements stated in the definition.17 Therefore, the 
question examined in particular is whether the LPC is an organ of state which 
exercises a public power or performs a public function in terms of any 
legislation, or a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, which 
exercises a public power or performs a public function in terms of an 
empowering provision. The conclusion reached after analysing the relevant 
provisions of PAJA as well as the relevant case law on this specific issue is that 
the LPC qualifies as an organ of state as defined in s 239 of the Constitution at 
least when it exercises its disciplinary powers in terms of the LPA. 
 
Furthermore, the actions of the LPC that could possibly qualify as administrative 
actions and therefore possibly susceptible to judicial review under the provisions 
of PAJA where it is alleged that the constitutional right to just administrative 
action in s 33 of the Constitution has been infringed are identified. These actions 
are (a) the failure of the LPC to take disciplinary steps or a decision in regard to 
a complaint lodged against a legal practitioner; (b) the failure or refusal of the 
LPC to issue a legal practitioner with a Fidelity Fund Certificate; or (c) any other 
adverse disciplinary finding against a legal practitioner other than sanctions that 
may only be imposed by a court of law, such as suspension, an interdict or 
striking off of the legal practitioner’s name from the Roll of Legal Practitioners. 
 
 
15 Section 1(a)(ii) of PAJA. 
16 Section 1(b) of PAJA. 
17 The other elements of the definition are an organ of state, when exercising a power in terms of the 
Constitution or a provincial constitution, that the rights of any person should be adversely affected by 
the decision or failure to take a decision by any of the entities mentioned in the definition, and that the 
decision or failure to take a decision should have a direct, external legal effect. The LPC does not derive 
is powers from the Constitution or provincial constitution, hence this element is not the subject matter 
of this dissertation. 
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These actions, which the LPC is in terms of the LPA allowed to take, should at 
all times comply with the elements of the right to just administrative action, 
namely, lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness. 
 
As has been indicated above, this dissertation also examines the applicability of 
the constitutional right of access to information to the records of the LPC. The 
substantive requirements for the applicability of this right will be explained. 
These are that the organization must either be a public body or a private body as 
defined in s 1 of PAIA. This is necessary because PAIA distinguishes between 
the right of access to the records of a public body18 and the right of access to the 
records of a private body.19 
 
PAIA defines what constitute a private body20 and a public body21, respectively. 
The distinction between a private body and a public body is critical as their 
obligations in relation to the right of access to information are different. 
Peekhaus points out that the obligations of a public body are more stringent than 
those of a private body.22 Section 11 of PAIA obliges a public body to grant 
access to its records once there has been compliance with the prescribed 
requirements for accessing the required record unless the requested record can 
be refused in terms of one or more of the mandatory or discretionary grounds of 
refusal set out in Part 2 of Chapter 4 of PAIA.23 Section 50 of PAIA, which 
 
18 Section 11 of PAIA. 
19 Section 50 of PAIA. 
20 Section 1 of PAIA defines a private body to mean – 
(a) a natural person who carries or has carried on any trade, business or profession, but only in 
such capacity; 
(b) a partnership which carries or has carried on any trade, business or profession; or 
(c) or any former or existing juristic person, but excludes a public body. 
21 Section of PAIA defines a public body to include – 
(a) any department of state or administration in the national or provincial sphere of government or 
any municipality in the local sphere of government; or 
(b) any functionary or institution when – 
(i) exercising a power or performing a duty in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation. 
22 W Peekhaus ‘South Africa’s Promotion of Access to Information Act: An Analysis of Relevant 
Jurisprudence’ (2014) 4 Journal of Information Policy 570 at 577, available at 
http://www.jstor.or/stable/10.5325/jinfopoli.42014.0570 , accessed on 30 November 2018. 
23 Peekhaus op cit (n22) 578. See also President of the Republic of South Africa v M & G Media Limited 
2012 (2) SA 50 (SCA) at para 59; My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Another 2018 (8) BCLR 893 (CC) at para 23. 
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regulates access to the records of a private body, requires, in addition to 
compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements, the requester must 
show that the requested record is “required for the exercise or protection of any 
rights”, failing which, the requested record may be refused on this ground, this 
in addition to any mandatory or discretionary ground of refusal among those set 
out in Part 3 of Chapter 4 of PAIA.24 
 
In the circumstances, the question that is examined in particular is whether the 
LPC is a public body, an entity duty bound to grant access to the requested record 
unless the request of access to a record can be defeated by one or more of the 
recognised mandatory or discretionary grounds of refusal in Part 2 of Chapter 4 
of PAIA, or a private body, an entity with respect to which a person seeking 
access to a record will need to show that the information is required for the 
exercise or protection of rights. The conclusion reached after analysing relevant 
provisions of PAIA and case law is that if a record that is requested from the 
LPC in terms of the PAIA relates to the LPC’s exercise of its powers which are 
regarded as public in nature, then the LPC, whilst being a corporate body in terms 
of s 4 of the LPA, it will, however, be regarded as a public body. This will be the 
case in relation to a record relating to the LPC’s exercise of its disciplinary powers 
in terms of the LPA. This means that, the LPC, as a public body, would be duty 
bound to grant access to the requested record unless the request of access to a 
record can be defeated by one or more of the recognised mandatory or 
discretionary grounds of refusal in Part 2 of Chapter 4 of PAIA. The LPC would 
be regarded as a private body in relation to a request of access to record that does 
not involve the exercise of a power that is public in nature. This would mean that 
a person seeking access to a record to a record of the LPC as a private body would 
need to show that the record is required for the exercise or protection of rights. 
The meaning of this additional requirement “required for the exercise or 
protection of any rights”, which is applicable to a request of access to a record 
of a public body, will be explained with reference to case law. 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Ibid. See also Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk 2006 (4) SA 436 (SCA) at para 17. 
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The application of the mandatory and discretionary grounds set out in Part 2 and 
Part 3 in Chapter 4 of PAIA will also be explained with reference to case law. 
 
The issue identified to be examined in this dissertation turn essentially on the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of PAJA and PAIA. The Constitution 
encourages consideration of foreign law when any provision in the Bill of Rights 
is being interpreted.25 The applicability of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the 
HRA”) and the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) specifically to the 
Law Society of England and Wales in the United Kingdom will be used as a 
basis of comparison because, as pointed out by Maripe, South Africa is one of 
the Commonwealth countries that apply English law. 26 
 
The value of foreign jurisprudence was recognised by the Constitutional Court 
in M & G Limited where the court stated that foreign jurisprudence “is of value 
because it shows how courts in other jurisdictions have dealt with the issues” 
confronting South Africa.27 Additionally, and as stated by Justice Aharon Barak 
, the two jurisdictions “share common fundamental values”, the institutions in 
these jurisdictions will often share “corresponding roles and similar legal 
problems”, thus using the United Kingdom as a basis of comparison will enrich 
“the options available” for addressing legal problems that are encountered and it 
will indicate “the successes and failures that may result from adopting a 
particular legal solution”.28 Furthermore, Corder explains that the development 
of South African law was left behind because of the international isolation of 
South Africa before 1994.29 Moreover, the court in the United Kingdom has 
considered the application of the HRA and FOIA, the two pieces of legislation 
equivalent to the South African PAJA and PAIA, to the Law Society of England 
 
 
 
 
25 Section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
26B Maripe ‘Judicial Review and the Public/Private Body Dichotomy: An appraisal of Developing 
Trends’ (2006) University of Botswana Law Journal 23 at 26, available at 
https://journals.co.za/docserver/fulltext/UBLJ/4/12/196.pdf , accessed on 19 April 2016. 
27President of Republic of South Africa v M & G supra (n23) at para 16. 
28 Aharon Barak “Response to the Judges as Comparatist: Comparison in Public Law” (2005) Faculty 
Scholarship Series 196 available at https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3694 accessed on 
17 February 2019. 
29H Corder ‘Comparing Administrative Justice Across the Commonwealth’ (2007) 2. 
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and Wales, the equivalent body of the LPC in South Africa. 30 In the 
circumstances, the use of English law as a basis of comparison will help provide 
an understanding of the aspects of the South African law necessary to be 
reviewed in order to enhance the accountability and transparency of organs of 
state or public bodies and private bodies in South Africa in regard to the 
performance of their functions. 
 
Lastly, legal obstacles that needs to be addressed for the enhancement of 
accountability and transparency of organs of state, public and private bodies, and 
also to facilitate the exercise, realization, enforcement and protection of the 
constitutional right to just administrative action in s 33 of the Constitution, as 
well as the constitutional right of access to information in s 32 of the Constitution 
by the ordinary people in South Africa, without legal representation which can 
at times be costly and unaffordable, will be identified. Recommendations for the 
necessary law reforms will be proposed in conclusion of the dissertation. 
 
2. Background to the Study 
 
 
South Africa is a constitutional democracy that is founded on the rule of law31, 
accountability and openness32, amongst others. These founding values of the 
Constitution influence interpretation and applicability of laws that have been 
passed by the Legislature to give effect to the right to just administrative action 
and the right of access to information. Section 39 of the Constitution requires 
that, when the Bill of Rights is interpreted, the founding values set out in the 
Constitution, which underlie an open and democratic society, must be promoted. 
 
The objectives of PAJA, as stated in the preamble, are to “create a culture of 
accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration or in the 
exercise of public power or the performance of a public function, by giving effect 
to the right to just administrative action.” Also, in its preamble, PAIA states that 
 
 
30Law Society v Secretary of the State for Justice [2010] EWHC 352 (QB), 26 February 2010, available 
at https://www.employmentcasesupdate.co.uk/ , accessed on 28 June 2016. 
31  Section 1(c) of the Constitution. 
32  Section 1(d) of the Constitution. 
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it is intended to “foster a culture of transparency and accountability in public and 
private bodies by giving effect to the right of access to information. Furthermore, 
the preamble of the LPA states as one of its objective as being to “ensure that the 
values underpinning the Constitution are embraced and that the rule of law is 
upheld” and “to ensure the accountability of the legal profession to the public”, 
amongst the others. 
 
Despite the existence of legislation entrenching and giving effect to the values 
of transparency and accountability, the now defunct Law Societies had been 
criticised for lack of transparency and accountability particularly in regard to the 
exercise of their disciplinary powers against attorneys in terms of the Attorneys 
Act.33 There had been calls for the controlling and regulatory bodies of the legal 
profession to be transparent and accountable for the exercise of their powers and 
performance of their functions.34 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the Constitution, which is founded on the 
values of accountability, responsiveness and openness, as well as the Bill of 
Rights, were not in place when the Attorneys Act, which created the Law 
Societies, came into effect. Hoexter states that, with the adoption of the 
Constitution and its recognition as the highest law, it became necessary for the 
legal profession as well as its regulation “to adapt to a new model of 
constitutional democracy.”35 As stated above, the LPA, which has replaced the 
Attorneys Act its entirety, embraces the founding values of the Constitution, 
namely, accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 Attorneys Act 53 of 1959. 
34 See W Saunderson-Meyer “Just Trust me, I’m a lawyer ...”Thought Leader, 13 April 2013 
https://thoughtleader.co.za/williamsaundersonmeyer/2013/04/13/just-trust-me-im-a-lawyer/, accessed 
on 08 December 2015. See also JH Jeffery, MP ‘Keynote Address at the Annual General Meeting of 
the Kwa-Zulu-Natal Law Society’, 18 October 2013, available at 
www.justice.gov.za/m_speeches/2013/20131018-dm-kzn-law-society.html, accessed on 08 December 
2015. 
35 C Hoexter “Administrative Action in the Courts” 2006 Acta Juridica, 303. 
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3. Problem Statement 
 
 
Legislation that has been passed to give effect to the founding values of the 
Constitution, specifically PAJA and PAIA, does not necessarily facilitate the 
realization of accountability, responsiveness and openness in practice. There are 
legal obstacles that need to be addressed to enhance accountability and openness 
of organs of state or public bodies and private bodies, and also to facilitate the 
exercise, realization and enforcement of the fundamental right of access to 
information in s 32 of the Constitution, as well as the right to just administrative 
action in s 33 of the Constitution, by ordinary people without legal 
representation, which can be costly and unaffordable for the majority of people 
in South Africa. 
 
The major legal obstacle is the meaning of the term “public”. The term “public” 
is significant in the determination of the applicability of both PAJA and PAIA. 
It plays a significant role in the determination of organizations that may fall 
within the category of an “organ of state” as defined in s 239 of the Constitution 
and those that are not. It plays a crucial role in the determination of actions that 
fall within the definition of “administrative action” as defined in s 1 of PAJA. 
 
The court in Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western 
Cape) stated that s 33 of the Constitution is not concerned with every act of 
administration, but was designed to control the conduct of the public 
administration when it exercises a public power.36 The aggrieved person who 
cannot show that a specific conduct qualifies as an administrative action as 
defined in s 1 of PAJA would not able to exercise the constitutional to just 
administrative action. Currie and Klaaren point out that the constitutional right 
to just administrative action is applicable to the exercise of public power, which 
means that this right does not apply to the exercise of private power.37 
 
 
 
36 Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) CC 2001 (3) SA 1013 (SCA) 
at para 16. 
37 I Currie and J Klaaren The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook 1ed (2001) 26. 
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The term “public” is also central in the determination of a distinction between a 
public body and a private body as defined in s 1 of PAIA. Peekhaus points out 
that 
“the pivotal query for determining whether an entity is a public or private body 
for purposes of the act would seem to turn on whether the body is exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation. Being 
able to clearly differentiate between public and private bodies is more than just 
an exercise in accurate categorization.”38 
 
In terms of s 8 of PAIA, an organization may be regarded as either a public body 
or a private body depending on whether the record that is requested relates to the 
exercise of a public power or not. It is also significant in the determination of 
what constitute a “public authority” for the purposes of the HRA and FOIA in 
the United Kingdom.39 
 
The Constitution, PAJA, PAIA in South Africa, as well as the HRA and FOIA 
in the United Kingdom, all recognise that, at times, private bodies and public 
bodies can act in more than one capacity. In other words, the law in South Africa 
and in the United Kingdom recognises that, at times, a private body may exercise 
powers that are public in nature, and that public bodies may also at times exercise 
powers that are private in nature. This position was also recognised by the 
Supreme Court of Namibia in Makando v Disciplinary Committee for Legal 
Practitioners specifically in regard to the Commonwealth jurisdictions.40 It is for 
this reason that Mwanza expresses the view that the distinction between an organ 
of state, a public body and a private body has become blurred as private 
institutions that exercise a public power or perform a public function are subject 
to the same standards of accountability and transparency in the same way as an 
organ of state or a public body.41 Thus the distinction between a private body, 
 
 
38 Peekhaus op cit (n22) 577. 
39 Section 6 of the HRA defines a “public authority” to include any person whose functions are 
functions of a public nature. 
40Makando v Disciplinary Committee for Legal Practitioners (SA98/2011) [2011] NASC 26 (6 October 
2016) at para 49 available at https://namiblii.org/, accessed on 05 December 2016. See also AAA 
Investment (Proprietary) Limited v Micro Finance Regulatory Council 2007 (1) SA 343 (CC) at para 
119 where the Constitutional Court recognised that the “courts in South Africa and England have long 
recognised that nongovernmental agencies may be tasked with a regulatory function which is public in 
character”, hence “it is true that no bright line can be drawn between ‘public’ and private” functions. 
41 M Mwanza ‘The Public/Private Divide: An Outdated Concept of Governance in English Law’ 
Diffussion: the UClan Journal of Undergraduate Research 6(1), June 2014, 9, at p. 3, available at 
http://bcur.org/journals/index.php/Diffusion/article/viewFile, accessed on 20 April 2016. 
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public body or an organ of state is not always as clear cut, as a private body can 
become a public body or an organ of state, and a public body or an organ of state 
can also become a private body in certain circumstances. Peekhaus points out 
that this blurred distinction between a public body and a private body “has 
become the source of some confusion” for “the record holders and those seeking 
access to information under the Act”.42 It can also be the source of confusion to 
persons who want to exercise the right to just administrative action. 
 
However, the term “public”, as important as it is for the exercise, enforcement 
and protection of the right of access to information as well as the right to just 
administrative action, its meaning has not been defined in the Constitution, 
PAJA and PAIA. It has also not been defined in the HRA.43 The meaning of the 
terms has also not been defined in FOIA. The Constitutional Court in Chirwa v 
Transnet Ltd recognised that the determination of what is public or not is a 
difficult exercise. 44 This difficulty has also been recognised by Williams 
regarding the applicability of the HRA in the United Kingdom, pointing out that 
there is no universal test for determining a public power or a public function.45 
 
The meaning of the term “public”, which is not always clear cut, is a legal 
obstacle which does not facilitate, but restricts the realization of accountability 
and transparency required from organs of state, public bodies and private bodies. 
If the nature of the power exercised or the function performed has not been 
correctly determined, the required accountability, responsiveness and openness 
could potentially be undermined. The right to just administrative action and the 
right of access to information may remain unfulfilled promises despite their 
recognition in the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
42 Peekhaus op cit (n22) 576. See also Kate Allan “Applying PAIA: Legal, Political and Contextual 
Issues” Paper Wars, page 148. 
43CD Campbell ‘The Nature of Power as Public in English Judicial Review’,(2009) 68(1) Cambridge 
Law Journal 90 at 100 – 102, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/40388773, accessed on 11 June 
2016. 
44Chirwa v Transnet Limited 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) at para 186. 
45 A Williams ‘Public Authorities: What Constitutes a hybrid public authority under the HRA?’ 04 April 
2013, available athttp://dro.dur.ac.uk/, accessed on 19 April 2016. 
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As stated above, the courts, as guardians of the Constitution and its values, are 
required by s 39(1) of the Constitution to promote the values that underlie an 
open and democratic society when interpreting any legislation. It was stated in 
Raduvha v Minister of Safety and Security that this requires the courts to play a 
meaningful role in giving content to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Bill 
of Rights.46 Indeed, and as required in terms of s 39(1) of the Constitution, the 
courts have interpreted and explained the applicability of the constitutional right 
of access to information and the right to just administrative action. However, the 
courts’ interpretation and explanation of the applicability of these two 
constitutional rights have not been incorporated into the provisions of PAIA and 
PAJA. This does not make it easy for ordinary unsophisticated people on their 
own and without legal representation to exercise and enforce the right of access 
to information and the right to just administrative action. 
 
It has already been stated above that the right of access to information and the 
right to just administrative action are justiciable in the sense that a person who 
feels that his or her rights have been violated by a decision denying or restricting 
the exercise and fulfilment of the rights, is entitled to approach a court or law or 
any other independent and impartial tribunal for appropriate relief. Despite the 
justiciability of these rights, many people who are living in poverty are less likely 
to have means and resources to approach the courts for the judicial enforcement 
and protection of these rights. The costs and complexity of court processes often 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals without adequate financial 
resources, knowledge and understanding of the applicability of the law, to 
successfully exercise their constitutional right of access to information and their 
right to just administrative action, with the result that these rights will, as pointed 
out by Brems and Adekoya, “remain unfulfilled promises for” the majority of 
people “despite their recognition in” the Constitution.47 Hoexter points out that 
not everyone has the financial resources required to litigate and that many 
potential applicants for judicial review are not challenging decisions in a court 
 
 
 
46 Raduvha v Minister of Safety and Security 2016 (10) BCLR 1326 (CC) at para 54. 
47 E Brems and CO Adekoya ‘Human Rights Enforcement by People Living in Poverty: Access to 
Justice in Nigeria’ (2010) 54. 2 Journal of African Law 258 
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of law, hence only a small proportion of decisions are challenged in the courts.48 
 
4. Scope and Objective of the Study 
 
 
The dissertation does not deal with all the provisions of PAJA and PAIA. It 
specifically does not deal with all the recognised grounds of judicial review 
under the provisions of PAJA.49 It also does not deal specifically with the 
recognised grounds on which a request for access to information may be 
refused50. It also does not deal with the procedural requirements, but only with 
the substantive requirements for the application of the constitutional right of 
access to information and constitutional right to just administrative justice. 
 
The dissertation examines the applicability of the constitutional right to just 
administrative action and the availability of a remedy of judicial review through 
PAJA to the LPC. It also examines the applicability of the constitutional right of 
access to information through PAIA to the LPC. It only interprets, with reference 
to case law, the relevant statutory provisions of PAJA, PAIA and LPA in order 
to establish whether the LPC is an organ of state which exercises a public power 
or performs a public function in terms of any legislation, or a natural or juristic 
person, other than an organ of state, which exercising a public power or performs 
a public function in terms of an empowering provision. The LPC’s exercise of 
its powers in terms of the LPA which may be regarded as administrative action 
and therefore susceptible to judicial review under the provisions of PAJA are 
identified. 
 
The study also seeks to establish whether the LPC is a public body, an entity 
duty bound to grant access to the requested record unless the request of access 
to a record can be defeated by one or more of the recognised mandatory or 
discretionary grounds of refusal in Part 2 of Chapter 4 of PAIA, or a private 
 
48 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2ed (2012) 169. 
49The grounds of review are set out in s 6(2) of PAJA. 
50Part 2 of Chapter 4 of PAIA sets out grounds of refusal in relation to a record required from a public 
body. The grounds of refusal in relation to a record held by a private body are set out in Part 3 of Chapter 
4 of PAIA. 
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body, an entity with respect to which a person seeking access to a record will 
need to show that the information is required for the exercise or protection of 
rights. 
 
The study will hopefully be useful for people wishing to exercise and enforce 
the right of access to information and the right to just administrative action 
against the LPC. It is of paramount importance that people have a clear 
understanding of when the provisions of PAJA may become applicable to the 
conduct of the LPC. Similarly, it is important to also have a clear understanding 
of which provisions of PAIA may be applicable to the records of the LPC. 
 
5. Methodology of Research 
 
 
The study relies on the relevant applicable legislative provisions of the 
Constitution, LPA, the HRA, FOIA, case law, textbooks and journal articles 
pertaining to the issues set out above as the main objectives of this dissertation. 
 
6. Description of Chapters 
 
 
The study comprises of four chapters. 
 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the issues that are being examined by the study; explains 
the importance of the subject matter of the study, sets out the background to the 
study, the statement of the problem, scope and objectives of the study and the 
methodology of research used and relied upon to address the issues identified for 
examination in this dissertation. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the applicability of the constitutional right to just 
administrative action and the availability of judicial review in terms of PAJA to 
the powers and functions of the LPC. The ultimate objective is to establish 
whether the LPC is organ of state which exercises a public power or performs a 
public function in terms of any legislation, or a natural or juristic person, other 
than an organ of state, which exercising a public power or performs a public 
function in terms of an empowering provision. The LPC’s powers that may be 
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regarded as administrative action and therefore susceptible to judicial review 
under the provisions of PAJA are identified. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the applicability of the constitutional right of access to 
information as provided in terms of PAIA to the LPC. The ultimate objective is 
to establish whether the LPC is a public body, an entity duty bound to grant 
access to the requested record unless the request of access to a record can be 
defeated by one or more of the recognised mandatory or discretionary grounds 
of refusal in Part 2 of Chapter 4 of PAIA, or a private body, an entity with respect 
to which a person seeking access to a record will need to show that the 
information is required for the exercise or protection of rights. 
 
Chapter 4 concludes the study and some legislative amendments to the 
provisions of both PAJA and PAIA are proposed with the view of addressing the 
identified legal obstacles. The proposed legislative amendments will enhance the 
exercise, realisation, enforcement and protection of both the right to just 
administrative action and the right of access to information. Once effected, there 
will certainly be a culture of openness, responsiveness and accountability among 
organs of state or public bodies and private bodies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
APPLICABILITY OF PAJA TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL 
PRACTICE COUNCIL 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This Chapter examines the applicability of the constitutional right to just 
administrative action and the availability of a remedy of judicial review in terms 
of PAJA against decisions of the LPC. The substantive requirements for the 
applicability of PAJA are discussed. The decisions of the LPC that may be 
susceptible to judicial review under the provisions of PAJA are identified. The 
applicability of PAJA to the LPC in South Africa is compared to the applicability 
of the HRA to the Law Society of England and Wales in the United Kingdom. 
 
2. Substantive Requirements for the Applicability of PAJA 
 
The court in Pennington v Friedgood stated that administrative action is the 
required jurisdictional fact for the application of the constitutional right to just 
administrative action and availability of judicial review under the provisions of 
PAJA which gives effect to this constitutional right.51 As pointed out by Currie 
and Klaaren, PAJA is not applicable to any action or conduct that is not 
administrative action as defined in s 1 of PAJA.52 In other words, the conduct 
complained of must constitute administrative action. 
 
The aggrieved person who cannot show that the action or conduct qualifies as an 
administrative action as defined in s 1 of PAJA is not able to exercise the 
constitutional right to just administrative action in s 33 of the Constitution as 
well as the right of access to justice which is guaranteed in s 34 of the 
Constitution. Stated differently, this jurisdictional requirement may preclude 
access to courts as an aggrieved person may not be heard in a court of law or 
 
 
51 Pennington v Friedgood (2002 (2) SA 251 (C) at 263B-D. See also I Currie The Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act: A Commentary 2ed (2007) 49. 
52 I Currie and J Klaaren op cit (n37) 35. 
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tribunal if the conduct that complained of does not qualify as administrative 
action. 
 
The HRA, which regulates judicial review in the United Kingdom, is applicable 
to a “public authority” which has been defined in s 6(3)(b) of the HRA to include 
“any person certain of whose functions are functions of public nature”. 
 
Whilst s 33 of the Constitution does not define what is meant by “administrative 
action”, this concept is defined in s 1 of PAJA. According to Hoexter, the 
definition of administrative action in s 1 of PAJA sets out certain substantive 
requirements that must exist for the constitutional right to just administrative 
action and the remedy of judicial review to be applicable and these are, namely, 
(a) the organization must be subject to the provisions of PAJA; (b) the 
administrative action must materially and adversely affect rights and (c) the 
administrative action must have a direct, external legal effect.53 
 
Furthermore, s 33(1) of the Constitution identifies the aspects of the right to just 
administrative action and these are lawfulness, procedural fairness and 
reasonableness. These three elements of the right to just administrative action 
are also some of the grounds of review in terms of s 6 of PAJA. 
 
In Chirwa the court stated that the onus to establish compliance with these 
substantive requirements in an application for judicial review in terms of PAJA 
is on the applicant. This requires the applicant in judicial review proceedings that 
are brought in terms of PAJA to provide evidence that the body that took the 
decision sought to be reviewed is either an organ of state which has exercised a 
power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or exercised a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation; or a 
natural person or juristic person, other than an organ of state, which has exercised 
a public power or performed a public function in terms of an empowering 
provision. The court stated further that it is incumbent on the applicant in judicial 
review proceedings to identify specifically the right or rights that have been 
 
 
 
53 Hoexter op cit (n48) 197. 
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adversely affected by the decision as well as the external, direct legal effect of 
the decision.54 
 
3. Is the LPC subject to PAJA? 
 
One of the substantive requirements for the applicability of the constitutional 
right to just administrative action and the availability of a remedy of judicial 
review through PAJA is that an administrative action must be taken by an organ 
of state which exercises a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or exercises a public power or performs a public function in terms 
of any legislation; or a natural person or juristic person, other than an organ of 
state, which exercises a public power or performs a public function in terms of 
an empowering provision. Therefore, both organs of state and private entities 
can take an administrative action. Thus, PAJA is applicable to the actions of both 
private bodies and organs of state which are administrative in nature. 
 
Accordingly, this section will examine whether the LPC is an entity that can take 
an administrative action. In other words, it will be established whether or not the 
LPC is an organ of state which exercises a power in terms of the Constitution or 
a provincial constitution; or exercises a public power or performs a public 
function in terms of any legislation; or a natural person or juristic person, other 
than an organ of state, which exercises a public power or performs a public 
function in terms of an empowering provision. According to Currie and Klaaren, 
this element of the definition looks at the person taking the decision as opposed 
to the subject matter of the decision.55 
 
The examination of this question will also entail the determination of what is 
meant by an “organ of state” and the term “public” which is significant in the 
determination of the applicability of PAJA and the availability of the remedy of 
judicial review. The term “public” also plays a significant role in the 
 
 
 
54Chirwa v Transnet Limited supra (n44) at para 13. 
55 Currie and Klaaren op cit (n37) 69. 
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determination of the applicability of the HRA and the availability of the remedy 
of judicial review in the United Kingdom. 
 
The LPC is not a natural person, but a body corporate in terms of s 4 of the LPA. 
It was explained by the Constitutional Court in My Vote Counts NPC v Minister 
of Justice and Correctional Services that the attributes of a juristic person include 
the legal capacity of an organization to sue and to be sued in its own and that such 
legal personality status is conferrable either by legislation or the common law.”56 
In terms of s 6(1)(a)(v) of the LPA, the LPC has the legal capacity to sue and to 
be sued in its own name. 
 
Section 1 of PAJA defines an “organ of state” with reference to s 239 of the 
Constitution.57 An “organ of state” is defined in s 239 of the Constitution to mean 
any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local 
sphere of government; 58 or any other functionary or institution exercising a 
power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
Constitution;59 or exercising a public power or performing a public function in 
terms of any legislation.60 
 
It is important to note that that the definition of an “organ of state” in terms of s 
239 of the Constitution does not only mean government departments but it also 
includes other institutions exercising a public power or performing a public 
function in term of the Constitution, a provincial constitution or in terms of any 
legislation. Also, in the United Kingdom, private bodies that are performing 
public functions are treated as public authorities for the purposes of judicial 
review in terms of the HRA.61 
 
The LPC is not a department of state or administration in the national, provincial 
or local sphere of government. It neither exercises power nor performs 
 
 
56 My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services supra (n23) at para 64. 
57 See section 1(ix) of PAJA. 
58 Section 239(a) of the Constitution. 
59 Section 239(b)(i) of the Constitution. 
60 Section 239(b)(ii) of the Constitution. 
61A Williams ‘Public Authorities: What Constitutes a hybrid public authority under the HRA?’2, 10, 04 
April 2013, available at http://dro.dur.ac.uk/, accessed on 19 April 2016. 
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functions in terms of the Constitution of a provincial Constitution. It is a creature 
of statute established in terms of s 4 of the LPA. It derives its powers and 
functions from the LPA. An institution qualifies as an ‘organ of state’ in terms 
of s 239 if it exercises a public power or performs a public function in terms of 
legislation. As stated by Currie and Klaaren, the focus is on the public nature or 
not of the function or power.62 According to Currie and De Waal, this provision 
requires an institution to derive powers from a statute or perform a function in 
terms of a statute. It also requires that the nature of the power or function (and 
not the nature of the functionary or institution) must be public.63. Hoexter points 
out that “the ‘public’ or ‘private’ nature of the entity is by no means decisive and 
the focus thus falls mainly on nature of the power being exercised or the function 
being performed” and this is the position applicable in English Law as well.64 
 
In the circumstances, the question that requires examination is whether the 
powers or functions of the LPC as derived from the LPA are public in nature. 
 
The term “public” is significant in the determination of the question whether the 
LPC falls within the definition of an “organ of state” in s 239 of the Constitution. 
It is also central in the determination of the question whether the Law Society of 
England and Wales is a public authority as defined in s 6 of the HRA. Currie and 
De Waal point out that the term “public”, as important as it is, has not been 
defined in the Constitution65 and PAJA. It has also not been defined in the HRA. 
Campbell points out that the law provides no means of determining when the 
function is public for the purposes of subjecting an institution to judicial review 
under the provisions of the HRA in the United Kingdom.66The Constitutional 
Court in Chirwa recognised that the determination of what is public or not is a 
difficult exercise.67 
 
 
 
 
62 Currie and Klaaren op cit (n37) 70. 
63 I Currie and J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook, 6ed (2013) 43-44. 
64 Hoexter op cit (n49) 3. 
65 Currie and De Waal op cit (n63) 44. 
66CD Campbell ‘The Nature of Power as Public in English Judicial Review’, Cambridge Law Journal 
68(1), March 2009,90 at 100 – 102, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/40388773, accessed on 11 
June 2016. 
67Chirwa v Transnet Limited supra (44) at para 186. 
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The courts, as guardians of the Constitution and the values it espouses, have, as 
required in terms of s 39(1) of the Constitution, interpreted and explained the 
applicability of the constitutional right to just administrative action through 
PAJA. The Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa v 
South African Rugby Football Union explained that the applicability of the 
constitutional right to just administrative action and the availability of judicial 
review through PAJA is not determined so much by the nature of the institution 
but by the nature of the power exercised or the function performed, which must 
be administrative in character. Therefore, the right question to be asked is 
whether the power exercised, or the function performed is administrative or not. 
The considerations in that regard include the source of the power exercised or 
the function performed; the subject matter of the power exercised or the function 
performed, whether it involves the exercise of a public duty, and how closely it 
is related on the one hand to policy matters which are not administrative, and on 
the other hand to the implementation of legislation, which is.68 
 
It was further explained in Makando that 
“the source of the power to perform the task will be an important pointer. An 
administration is primarily concerned with the implementation of legislation, 
and the tasks and functions of administrative bodies are in most cases provided 
in the statutes. Accordingly, where the source of a task is statutory, it is more 
likely that the task will be administrative in nature. If the task is one performed 
in the interest of the public or a section of the public, as opposed to a private 
interest, it again is more likely that the task will be administrative in 
character”.69 
 
Hoexter states that some of the factors which have found acceptance by the 
courts include the extent of state involvement and control over the power or 
function, that public funding could provide a significant clue in this regard as 
well and has also featured as a factor in several cases. She states that public 
power has rightly been associated with a duty to act in the public interest or in 
pursuance of a public duty rather than for private purposes.70 Currie and Klaaren 
point out that it is the public character of a decision that is determinative and that 
 
 
68President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) SA (CC) at 
paras 141-143. 
69Makando v Disciplinary Committee for Legal Practitioners supra (n40) at para 52. 
70 Hoexter op cit (n48) p.4. 
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“decisions of a private nature that do not entail the exercise of public power are 
not subject to the constitutional administrative right or to PAJA”.71 
 
The courts in the United Kingdom have also played a significant role by 
providing guidance to assist in the identification of functions that are public in 
nature. The factors as developed by the courts in United Kingdom, which are to 
be taken into consideration in the determination of the functions that are public 
include the duty of a body to act in the public interest, the provision of public 
funding to the body and possession by the body concerned of statutory powers.72 
According to Campbell, a public authority may either be an authority that is in 
itself governmental or an authority which, while non-governmental, nonetheless 
exercises government function along with its non-governmental functions. A 
body which performs only public functions is referred to as a core public 
authority, and the one which performs both governmental and non-governmental 
function is referred to as a hybrid public authority.73 Kilroy and Chambers also 
point out that the courts have indicated that a statutory authority for the 
performance of functions as well as the extent of control by a public authority 
over a particular body are additional considerations when determining whether 
the function performed is public or not. They also mention that the courts have 
recognised that there is no single test of universal application given the diverse 
nature of governmental function and the variety of means by which these 
functions are discharged. They describe the test that looks at the nature of the 
function that is performed as opposed to the nature of the institution that 
performs a function as a “functional test”.74 
 
Therefore, whether the LPC is an organ of state or a juristic person other than an 
organ of state or a body corporate, is not an overriding consideration for the 
application of the constitutional right to just administrative action and the 
availability of the remedy of judicial review. It is important that the task is 
 
 
71 Currie and Klaaren op cit (n37) 47-48. 
72CD Campbell ‘The Nature of Power as Public in English Judicial Review’, Cambridge Law  Journal 
68(1), March 2009,90 at 100 – 102, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/40388773, accessed on 11 
June 2016. 
73 Ibid. 
74 C Kilroy and M Chambers ‘Local authorities and the Human Rights Act 1998’, 1, available at 
https://www.ihrec.ie/download/doc/paper20041016_echr_kilroy.doc, accessed on 05 December 2016. 
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administrative in nature. Quinot and Maree point out that the focus of 
administrative law takes a functional approach as opposed to an institutional 
approach, where it is the function of a public administration rather than the nature 
of the institution that is determinative of the applicability of the constitutional 
right to just administrative action and the availability of a remedy of judicial 
review.75 As indicated above, this is also the approach followed in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
According to Hoexter, the implementation of legislation is an administrative 
act.76 Currie and Klaaren states that, in order for a decision to qualify as 
administrative action it must be made under an empowering provision. The LPC 
is a creature of statute and as such it derives its powers and functions from the 
LPA which is the governing statute. The LPA’s preamble states that it had been 
passed to regulate the legal profession in the public interest and not in the interest 
of legal practitioners. It is therefore different from a voluntary legal association 
which is created by lawyers to advocate the interest of its members. 
 
The LPC is in terms of the LPA empowered to investigate complaints of 
misconduct against legal practitioners and to take necessary disciplinary action.77 
The applicability of the constitutional right to just administrative action to the 
Law Society’s exercise of its disciplinary powers in terms of the Attorneys Act 
was considered by the court in Graham v Law Society of the Northern Provinces 
where the court concluded that 
“where the Law Society takes disciplinary steps against a legal practitioner, it 
does so as an organ of state in the exercise of a public power and in the 
performance of a public function in terms of the Act. The decision to institute 
a disciplinary enquiry on a practitioner constitutes an administrative action as 
defined in section 1 of PAJA”.78 
 
Thus, when the LPC exercises its disciplinary powers or performs its disciplinary 
functions in terms of the LPA, it will be subject to the provisions of PAJA as an 
 
75 G Quinot& P Maree “Administrative Action” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative Justice in South Africa 
(2015) 66-694. See also Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 (6) SA 313 
(SCA) at para 24; Chirwa v Transnet Limited supra (n44) at para 15. 
76 Hoexter op cit (n49) 54. See also President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby 
Football Union supra (n68) at 142. 
77 Section 40 of the LPA. 
78 Graham v Law Society of the Northern Provinces.2014 (4) SA 229 (GP) at para 80. 
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organ of state. The exercise of the disciplinary powers or the performance of the 
disciplinary functions by the LPC would be properly characterised as 
administrative in nature as the main objective of the LPC’s power of discipline 
against legal practitioners is to protect the interest of the public, hence the 
disciplinary function of the LPC is likely to attract judicial review in terms of 
PAJA where it is alleged that the constitutional right to just administrative action 
has been infringed. In other words, the LPC, when it exercises its disciplinary 
powers, it would be subject to the provisions of PAJA. Judicial review 
proceedings would be available to challenge a disciplinary decision of the LPC 
where it is claimed that the LPC acted unfairly in the exercise of its disciplinary 
powers or the performance of its disciplinary functions in terms of the LPA. The 
implication of the finding that the LPC is an organ of state when it exercises its 
disciplinary powers in terms of the LPA is that the Bill of Rights not only binds 
the state and all its organs, but also places a positive obligation or duty on the 
state to “respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the Rights in the Bill of Rights”.79 
 
The question whether the Law Society of England and Wales is a public 
authority when it performs its disciplinary functions against solicitors was 
considered in the matter between Law Society v Secretary for Justice. The court 
held that, whilst the Law Society of England and Wales is institutionally not a 
public authority,80 the performance of regulatory functions that are intended “to 
protect the public by bringing to account practitioners whose services fall below 
acceptable standard can be said to be administrative rather than anything else”, 
hence the Legal Complaints Service of the Law Society of England and Wales 
would be properly characterised as a public administrative authority who 
decision was susceptible to judicial review under the provisions of the HRA.81 
 
4. Decision Adversely Affecting Rights 
 
The other substantive requirement for the applicability of the constitutional right 
to just administrative action and the availability of a remedy of judicial review 
through PAJA is that the decision must adversely affect someone’s rights. 
 
79 Section 7(1) of the Constitution. 
80Law Society v Secretary of the State for Justice supra (n30) at para 83. 
81Law Society v Secretary of the State for Justice supra (n30) at paras 66, 69 and 79. 
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According to Currie and Klaaren, this requirement focuses on the consequence 
or effect of a decision.82 They state that this would include a decision removing 
someone’s rights or making an adverse determination of rights.83 They point out 
further that the decision must have an adverse impact on the rights to qualify as 
administrative action.84 
 
The Namibian Supreme Court in Makando recognised that the exercise of 
disciplinary powers or the performance of disciplinary functions affects the 
rights and interests of the members of the public.85 It was recognised in Graham 
that a disciplinary finding against the complainant in favour of a legal 
practitioner could adversely affect the complainant’s rights, hence such a 
decision could, at the instance of the aggrieved complainant, give rise to a review 
by the court of its decision. The court also recognised that the failure to take 
disciplinary steps or a decision regarding a complaint against a legal practitioner 
could also adversely affect the complainant’s rights, hence the failure to take 
disciplinary steps or a decision regarding complaints against legal practitioners 
could be amenable to judicial review under the provisions of PAJA.86 Also, an 
adverse disciplinary finding against a legal practitioner and frivolous or 
fabricated complaints against legal practitioners could damage professional 
reputations or careers of legal practitioners, thus adversely affecting the rights of 
the legal practitioners to practice their chosen trade, occupation and 
profession.87An adverse disciplinary finding against a legal practitioner could 
also be amenable to judicial review under the provisions of PAJA. 
 
In terms of s 84, read with s 85 of the LPA, the LPC is empowered to issue legal 
practitioners who practise for their own account, in partnership or as directors of 
a legal practice which is a juristic legal entity, with the prescribed requirements 
a Fidelity Fund Certificate on compliance with the prescribed requirements. In 
terms of s 93(8) of the LPA, a legal practitioner who practises without a Fidelity 
Fund Certificate commits an offence making him or her “liable on conviction to 
 
82 Currie and Klaaren op cit (n37) 75. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Currie and Klaaren op cit (n37) 79. 
85 Makando v Disciplinary Committee for Legal Practitioners supra (n40) at para 49. 
86Graham v Law Society of the Northern Provinces supra (n78) at para 80. 
87 Section 22 of the Constitution. 
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a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or to both such fine 
and imprisonment”.88 A legal practitioner is also “liable to be struck off the 
Roll”.89 Additionally, the legal practitioner “is not entitled to any fee, reward, or 
reimbursement in respect of the legal services rendered”.90 It was held in Law 
Society of the Northern Provinces v Le Roux that the refusal to issue a legal 
practitioner with a Fidelity Fund Certificate would adversely affect the rights of 
the legal practitioners as they would not be able to practise their chosen trade, 
occupation and profession without it. The court also held that such a decision 
qualified as an administrative action made by an organ of state or juristic person 
exercising a public power and performing a public function in terms of an 
empowering provision, hence it would be susceptible to judicial review under 
the provisions of PAJA.91 
 
The LPC is empowered in terms of s 87(2)(a) of the LPA to “inspect the 
accounting records of any trust account practice”. In Law Society of the Northern 
Provinces v Maseka the court held that an inspection of the legal practitioner’s 
books does not adversely affects the rights, hence the constitutional right to just 
administrative action and the remedy of judicial review through PAJA are not 
applicable in such instances.92 
 
5. Direct, External Legal Effect Decision 
 
The other requirement for the applicability of the constitutional right to just 
administrative action and the availability of a remedy of judicial review is that 
the decision must have a direct, external legal effect. The meaning of this 
requirement has been explained by the court in Van Zyl v New National Party 
where it was held that it required a decision by an administrative body to be 
final.93 Currie points out that the definition of an administrative action in terms 
of PAJA for the applicability of the constitutional right to just administrative 
 
 
88 Section 93(8)(a) of the LPA. 
89 Section 93(8)(b) of the LPA. 
90 Section 93(8)(c) of the LPA. 
91Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Le Roux (185/2015) [2015] ZASCA 168 (26 November 
2015) at para 17. 
92Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Maseka 2005 (6) SA 372 (BH) at 25. 
93Van Zyl v New National Party 2003 (10) BCLR 1167 (C) at para 85. See also Currie op cit (n52) 2. 
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action and the availability of a remedy of judicial review under the provisions of 
PAJA excludes “preliminary determinations taken prior to the final decision 
being made.”94 It is therefore clear that the constitutional right to just 
administrative action and the remedy of judicial review under the provisions of 
PAJA is not applicable to every conduct of the administration.95 
 
Chapter 3 of the LPA provides for the admission and enrolment of legal 
practitioners. Section 24(2) of the LPA confers the right to admit and to authorise 
the enrolment of legal practitioners on the High Court.96 Furthermore, in terms 
of s 40(3) of the LPA, a disciplinary committee of the LPC is empowered to 
impose various penalties upon a legal practitioner found guilty of misconduct. 
The penalties include temporary suspension of a legal practitioner “from 
practising or from engaging in any particular aspect of the practice of law” 
pending the finalisation of a court application97, and making an application to 
the High Court for the name of the practitioner to be struck off the Roll.98 In 
terms of s 40(8) of the LPA the LPC is required to “give effect to the advice and 
decision of a disciplinary committee”. 
 
The provisions of s 40 of the LPA also confer the right to suspend and to strike 
off from the Roll of legal practitioners on the court. It has been explained in 
Bothma v Law Society of the Northern Province that where the right for 
admission and removal of legal practitioners has been conferred on a court, the 
controlling and regulatory body of the legal profession may oppose an 
application for the admission of a legal practitioner or for the removal of a legal 
practitioner from the Roll of legal practitioners and in so doing, it may bring 
certain facts to the attention of the court, but it does not have the authority to 
 
94 Currie op cit (n52) 51-54. 
95Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) supra (n36) at para 16. 
96 Section 24(2) of the LPA reads: “The High must admit to practise and authorise to be enrolled as a 
legal practitioner, … any person who, upon application, satisfies the court that he or she – 
(a) is duly qualified as set out in section 26; 
(b) is a - 
(i) South African citizen; 
(ii) permanent resident in the Republic; 
(c) is a fit and proper and proper person to be admitted; and 
(d) has served a copy of the application on the Council, containing the information as determined 
in the rules within the time period determine in the rules.” 
97 Section 40(3)(a)(iii) of the LPA. 
98 Section 40(3)(a)(iv)(aa) of the LPA. 
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admit, suspend or to strike off from the Roll the name of a legal practitioner.99 
Thus the decision of the LPC against the admission and enrolment of a legal 
practitioner is not final, hence the right to just administrative action and the 
remedy of judicial review through PAJA will not be available to a practitioner 
who has been aggrieved by the LPC’s decision in that regard. It is not the LPC 
that must make a final decision on the matter. The ultimate decision is that of the 
court. The LPC’s decision to bring a court application does not affect the rights 
of a legal practitioner as in so doing the LPC is not making any finding by 
bringing an application to court for the striking of the legal practitioner’s name 
from the Roll of legal practitioners. This also applies in respect of a court 
application for the suspension of a legal practitioner. 
 
In terms of s 37 of the LPA, the LPC is empowered to “establish investigating 
committees, consisting of a person or persons appointed by the Council to 
conduct investigations of all complaints of misconduct against legal 
practitioners”. It was held in Viking Pony Afrika Pumps v Hydro-tech systems 
that a decision to investigate and a process of investigation do not amount to an 
administrative action. It is only when a decision is taken following the 
investigation the action could have an adverse effect on the rights of any 
person.100 Thus, the decision to investigate and a process of investigation is 
excluded from the definition of an administrative action as such actions are not 
final and as such they cannot adversely affect the rights of any legal practitioner 
being investigated. It was also held in Graham that a court would not ordinary 
interfere with the disciplinary process until after it has been finalised.101 
 
It was held in Le Roux that a decision against issuing a legal practitioner with a 
Fidelity Fund Certificate which, as already stated above, would adversely affect 
the practitioner’s rights to practice his or her chose trade, occupation or 
profession, complies with the requirement for a decision to a direct external legal 
effect in order for the right to just administrative justice and the remedy of 
 
99 Bothma v Law Society of the Northern provinces: In re Law Society of the Northern Provinces 
(33739/2016) [2017] ZAGPHC 208 (25 May 2017) at para 9. 
100Viking Pony Afrika Pumps v Hydro-tech Systems 2011 (1) SA 327 (CC) at para 38. See also Omar v 
Law Society of the Northern Provinces (42471/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 179 (9 April 2014) at paras 22- 
23. 
101 Graham v Law Society of the Northern Provinces. supra (n78) at paras 78-80. 
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judicial review through PAJA may be applicable. This is so because the decision, 
said the court, remains binding until such time that it is set aside on review by a 
court.102 
 
6. Lawful, Reasonable and Procedurally Fair Decision 
 
Section 33(1) of the Constitution confers on everyone the right to just 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Section 2 
of the Constitution states that the “Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations 
imposed by it must be fulfilled.” As such, all the conduct of the LPC which 
qualifies as administrative action as defined in s 1 of PAJA must comply with 
the provisions of the Constitution, specifically the requirements set out in s 33(1) 
of the Constitution. In other words, the administrative action of the LPC must be 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Any administrative action which is 
unlawful, unreasonable and procedurally unfair will be inconsistent with the 
Constitution and, therefore, it will be invalid. 
 
Kotzé states that s 33(1) of the Constitution is intended to (a) eliminate possible 
abuse of power, (b) ensure that voices of individuals affected by the decision are 
heard and taken into consideration when a decision is made, and (c) ensure that 
reasons are given in order to justify any decision taken, which ensures that there 
is accountability to those who may be interested and/or affected by the 
decision.103 
 
As it has been stated above, the LPC’s exercise of its disciplinary powers or 
performance of its disciplinary function in terms of the LPA amounts to an 
administrative action as defined in s 1 of PAJA.104 The identified actions of the 
LPC that are properly characterised as administrative actions in that regard 
include the failure to take disciplinary steps or a decision regarding complaints 
 
 
102Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Le Roux supra (n91) at para 17. 
103 LJ Kotzé ‘The Application of Just Administrative Action in the South African Environmental 
Governance Sphere: An Analysis of some Contemporary Thoughts and Recent Jurisprudence’ (2004) 7 
PER/PELJ 58 at 67. 
104 See Graham v Law Society of the Northern Provinces supra (n78) at para 80. 
108 Hoexter, supra (n48) 224 
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against legal practitioners; an adverse disciplinary finding against a legal 
practitioner other than a court-imposed sanction such as suspension, interdict and 
removal of the legal practitioner’s name from the Roll of legal practitioners and 
the LPC’s refusal to issue a legal practitioner with the Fidelity Fund Certificate. 
These actions, which constitute administrative action as defined in s 1 of PAJA, 
must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair as required in terms of s 33(1) 
of the Constitution. A decision which fails to meet the requirements of 
lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness will be susceptible to judicial 
review on any of the grounds listed in s 6(2) of the PAJA.105 
 
The subsequent paragraphs explain the content and meaning of the constitutional 
requirements of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness of an 
administrative action. 
 
6.1 Lawful Administrative Action 
 
The requirement of lawfulness in s 33(1) of the Constitution encourages 
compliance with the principle of the rule of law. The rule of law is one of the 
founding values of the Constitution. 106 According to Hoexter, lawfulness 
requires the exercise of power or the performance of a function that constitute 
administrative action as defined in s 1 of PAJA to be authorised by law.107 In 
other words, institutions should be authorised by law to make an administrative 
action.108 This means that, in order for a court of law or tribunal to intervene and 
exercise its power of review, the decision challenged must have been taken in 
terms of an “empowering provision” which is defined in s 1 of PAJA as “a law, 
a rule of common law, customary law, or an agreement, instrument or other 
document in terms of which an administrative action was purportedly taken.” 
 
Therefore, it follows that, the LPC, as the creature of statute, does not have 
inherent powers and functions. Its powers and functions are derived from the 
 
 
105 The grounds of review of an administrative action as listed in s 6(2) of PAJA include unlawfulness, 
irrationality, unreasonableness and procedural unfairness, amongst the others. 
106 Section 1(c) of the Constitution. 
107 Hoexter supra (n48) 253. 
111 Hoexter supra (n48) 304. 
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LPA. Any administrative action that is not authorised by its governing statute 
will be unlawful. An unlawful administrative action or an exercise of power that 
is ultra vires i.e. that the LPC is not authorised to take in terms of the LPA, will 
be susceptible to judicial review in terms of s 6(2)(a)(i) or (ii) which empowers 
a court to review administrative action that is not authorised by law. Such 
administrative action will be invalid. 
 
6.2 Reasonable Administrative Action 
 
Relevant considerations to determine compliance with the requirement of 
reasonableness in s 33(1) of the Constitution were set out by the Constitutional 
Court in Bato Star Fishing Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, and these include the nature of the decision, reasons for the decision, 
nature of competing interests involved and the impact of the decision on the lives 
and wellbeing of those whom the decision affects.109 Hoexter states that 
rationality and proportionality are the important elements of reasonableness. 
 
The court in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO explained that the requirement 
of reasonableness requires that there should be a rationale connection between 
the decision made, the facts on which the decision is based and the reasons 
provided for the decision.110 It therefore means that the LPC should able to justify 
an administrative action by giving reasons thereof with reference to the 
information at its disposal, failing which the administrative decision may be 
challenged on the grounds of rationality as set out in s 6(2)(f)(ii)(aa) to (dd) of 
PAJA. 
 
According to Hoexter, the requirement of proportionality requires a balance 
between the facts of each case and the decision made.111 In other words, the 
circumstances of each case will determine whether an administrative action is 
reasonable or not. If the decision is not proportional, it may be susceptible to 
 
 
 
109Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) at para 45. 
110Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus No 1999 (3) SA 304 (LAC) at para 37. 
115 Section 39(6)(a)(iii) of the LPA. 
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judicial review in terms of s 6(2)(h) of PAJA if the exercise of the power was so 
unreasonable that no reasonable person could have exercised the power. 
 
6.3 Procedurally Fair Administrative Action 
 
Section 3 of PAJA prescribes a procedure to be followed for an administrative 
action to be compliant with the requirement of procedural fairness in s 33(1). In 
terms of s 3(2)(b) of PAJA a person to be affected by an administrative action 
must be given adequate notice of the nature of administrative action to be taken 
and a reasonable opportunity to make representations. 
 
According to Hoexter, the requirement of procedural fairness gives a person to 
be affected by the decision an opportunity to make submissions prior to a final 
decision being taken to possible influence the outcome, however, the audi 
alteram partem principle does not entitle a person to be affected by the decision 
to actively participate in the consideration of the matter and the decision-making 
process.112 Hoexter states that it is important that the person to be affected by the 
decision be advised of the outcome of the proceedings, when the decision was 
made and by whom the decision was made.113 
 
The provisions of ss 38, 39 and 40 of the LPA provide for a complaints procedure 
to be followed in the exercise of the LPC’s powers of discipline or performance 
of disciplinary functions. The provisions of this section incorporate the 
requirements of procedural fairness set out above. For instance, s 38(3) requires 
the allegations of misconduct, the members of the disciplinary committee, legal 
practitioners involved in the dispute and the outcome including the sanction 
imposed to be published on the LPC’s website and to be available for inspection 
by members of the public during business hours of the Council. In terms of s 
39(6) a legal practitioner who has been charged with misconduct is entitled to be 
present at the hearing of the proceedings114 and has the right to be heard.115 In 
terms of s 40, a legal practitioner who has been found guilty of misconduct must 
 
 
112 Hoexter supra (n48) 363. 
113 Hoexter supra (n48) 376. 
114 Section 39(6)(a)(i) of the LPA. 
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be informed of the finding 116 and can address a disciplinary committee in 
mitigation of the sanction that may be imposed.117 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has examined the applicability of the constitutional right to just 
administrative action and the availability of a remedy of judicial review in terms 
of PAJA to the LPC’s exercise of its powers and performance of its functions in 
terms of the LPA. The substantive requirements for the applicability of this right 
for the availability of a remedy of judicial review against the decisions of the 
LPC were explained. These substantive requirements are that, (a) the decision 
must qualify as administrative action as defined in s 1 of PAJA; (b) the 
organization must be subject to the provisions of PAJA; (c) the decision must 
adversely affect rights; (d) the decision must have a direct, external legal effect. 
 
The Constitutional Court in SARFU explained that the nature of the institution is 
not an important consideration when determining the applicability of the right to 
just administrative action and the availability of a remedy of judicial review 
under the provisions of PAJA. The court stated that what is an important 
consideration is the nature of the power exercised or function performed, which 
should be administrative in character. The considerations to determine the 
administrative character or not, as developed by the Constitutional Court in 
SARFU, include (a) the source of the power or function; (b) the subject matter of 
the power exercised or function performed, whether it involves the exercise of a 
public duty, and how closely it is related on the one hand to policy matters which 
are not administrative, and on the other hand to the implementation of legislation, 
which is administrative. 
 
It has been determined that the constitutional right to just administrative action 
in terms of PAJA impacts on certain decisions of the LPC and that a remedy of 
judicial review in terms of PAJA may be available against such decisions. The 
courts have confirmed that the right to just administrative action and the remedy 
 
 
116 Section 40(1)(b) of the LPA. 
117 Section 40(2) of the LPA. 
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of judicial review through PAJA may be applicable to the LPC’s exercise of its 
disciplinary powers or performance of such functions in terms of the LPA. The 
identified actions that could possibly qualify as administrative actions include 
(a) the failure to take disciplinary steps or a decision regarding complaints 
against legal practitioners; (b) failure or refusal to issue a legal practitioner with 
a Fidelity Fund Certificate and (c) adverse disciplinary findings against legal 
practitioners other than the sanctions that may be imposed only by the courts 
such as suspension, interdict and removal of the legal practitioner’s name from 
the Roll of legal practitioners. 
 
It is important that any conduct of the LPC that may regarded as administrative 
action as defined in s 1 of PAJA must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair 
as required in terms of s 33(1) of the Constitution. The content and meaning of 
these three requirements, which are applicable to an administrative action, have 
been explained. For an administrative action to be considered lawful, the LPC’s 
exercise of its powers or performance of its functions must be authorised by law. 
For an administrative decision to be considered reasonable, the LPC must be able 
to justify an administrative decision by giving reasons with reference to the 
information at its disposal. It is also important that an administrative decision is 
proportional to the facts at the LPC’s disposal. To ensure that an administrative 
action is procedurally fair, there must be compliance with the requirements set 
out in s 3 of PAJA, some of which have been incorporated in the provisions of 
the LPA. Any decision of the LPC which does not meet the requirements of 
lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness, as set out in s 33(1) of the 
Constitution; will be susceptible to judicial review on any one of the several 
grounds of review listed in s 6(2) of PAJA. 
35  
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
APPLICABILITY OF PAIA TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE 
COUNCIL 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
This Chapter examines the applicability of the constitutional right of access to 
information under the provisions of PAIA to the records of the LPC. The 
substantive requirements for the applicability of this right in terms of the 
provisions of PAIA are explained, namely that an organization must either be a 
public body or a private body as defined in s 1 of PAIA. Peekhaus states that the 
distinction between a public body and a private body “is critical because, 
although PAIA sets legislative rights of access to information held by both public 
and private bodies, the obligations that attach to the former are more stringent 
than for the latter”118 This is so because of s 32(1)(b) threshold requirement for 
a record to be “required for the exercise or protection of any rights”. 
 
The right of access to the records of a public body is regulated by s 11 of PAIA, 
and the right of access to the records of a private body is regulated by s 50 of 
PAIA. Section 11 of PAIA obliges a public body to grant access to its records 
once there has been compliance with the prescribed requirements for accessing 
the required record unless the requested record can be refused in terms of one or 
more of the mandatory or discretionary grounds of refusal set out in Part 2, 
Chapter 4 of PAIA.119 Section 50 of PAIA, which regulates access to the records 
of a private body, requires additional compliance with the prescribed procedural 
requirements in that the requester must be able to show that the requested record 
is “required for the exercise or protection of any rights”, failing which, the 
requested record may be refused on this ground, in addition to any mandatory or 
 
 
 
118 Peekhaus op cit (n22) 577. 
119 See President of the Republic of South Africa v M & G Media Limited supra (n23) at para 59; My 
Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services supra (n23) at para 23. 
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discretionary ground of refusal among those set out in Part 3, Chapter 4 of 
PAIA.120 
 
In the circumstances, the specific question that is examined in particular is 
whether the whether the LPC is a public body– and thus an entity duty bound to 
grant access to the requested record unless the request of access to a record can 
be defeated by one or more of the recognised mandatory or discretionary grounds 
of refusal in Part 2,Chapter 4 of PAIA - or a private body, in which case it is an 
entity with respect to which a person seeking access to a record will need to show 
that the information is required for the exercise or protection of rights. 
 
Furthermore, the applicability of PAIA to the records of the LPC in South Africa 
will be compared to the applicability of FOIA to the records of the Law Society 
of England and Wales in the United Kingdom. 
 
The conclusion reached after analysing relevant provisions of PAIA and relevant 
case law is that if a record that is requested from the LPC in terms of the PAIA 
relates to the LPC’s exercise of its powers which are regarded as public in nature, 
in a functional sense, then the LPC, whilst being a corporate body in terms of 
s. 4 of the LPA, would be regarded as a public body. This will be the case in 
relation to a record relating to the LPC’s exercise of its disciplinary powers in 
terms of the LPA. This means that, the LPC, as a public body, would be duty 
bound to grant access to the requested record unless the request of access to a 
record can be exempted on one or more of the recognised mandatory or 
discretionary grounds of refusal in Part 2 of Chapter 2 of Chapter 4 of the LPA. 
The LPC would be regarded as a private body in relation to a request of access 
to a record that does not involve the exercise of a power that is public in nature, 
which, in turn, would mean that a person seeking access to a record to a record 
of the LPC as a private body would need to show that the record is required for 
the exercise or protection of rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
120 See Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk supra (n24) at para 17. 
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Peekhaus points out that “the meaning and scope” of the additional requirement 
“required for the exercise or protection of any rights…has been left to the courts 
to interpret” as it has not been defined by PAIA.121 Therefore, the application of 
this requirement will be explained with reference to case law. Additionally, the 
application of the mandatory and discretionary grounds set out in Part 2 and Part 
3 in Chapter 4 of PAIA will also be explained with reference to case law. 
 
2. Section 32(1) of the Constitution 
 
 
Section 32(1) of the Constitution guarantees everyone a right of access to “any 
information held by the state.”122 This section also guarantees everyone a right 
of access to “any information that is held by another person and that is required 
for the exercise or protection of any rights.” What is meant by a “state” is not 
defined anywhere in the Constitution. The Constitutional Court explained in My 
Vote Counts NPC that the words “everyone” and “another person”, which are 
used in the provisions of s 32(1) of the Constitution, are “wide enough” to cover 
“both a juristic and a natural person”.123 
 
In terms of s 32(1) of the Constitution, the requirements for the applicability of 
this right to “the state” are different to the requirements for its applicability to 
any other person that is not the state. The applicability of the right of access to 
information held by the state is unqualified, hence the requested information 
“must be readily availed” by the state.124 However, access to information “held 
by another person” is conditional. Therefore, the state has a general obligation 
to be transparent and accountable, however, another person other than the state, 
has no general obligation. 
 
The rationale for the distinct requirements for the exercise of the constitutional 
right of access to information against “the state” and “another person” has not 
been explained anywhere in the provisions of the Constitution. It was explained 
 
 
121 Peekhaus op cit (n22) 578. 
122 Section 32(1)(b) of the Constitution 
123My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services supra (n23) at para 20. 
124My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services supra (n23) at para 23. 
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by the Constitutional Court in My Vote Counts NPC that the purpose for the 
justification of a request for access to information held by another person other 
than the state is to exclude “unnecessary or spurious requests” for information. 
To comply with this requirement in order to be granted access to the required 
information, the requester is required “to disclose the right(s) that the requester 
seeks to exercise or protect.”125 
 
3. The Importance of the Right of Access to Information 
 
 
The importance of the constitutional right of access to information, specifically 
for the media and journalists, some of whom had been very critical about the 
lack of transparency, accountability, responsiveness on the part of the now 
defunct provincial Law Societies in regard to the exercise of their disciplinary 
powers and performance of their disciplinary functions attorneys126, has been 
explained by the Constitutional Court in Brümmer v Minister for Social 
Developmen.127 In Brümmer, the Constitutional Court explained that that right of 
access to information allowed the media to exercise the right to freedom of 
expression enshrined in s 16 of the Constitution, which includes freedom of the 
press and other media128 and freedom to receive or impart information.129 The 
court explained that access to information by the media and journalists is 
“crucial” for their “accurate reporting” and conveyance of “accurate information 
to the public”.130 
 
The now defunct provincial Law Societies had been criticised for their lack of 
transparency, accountability and responsiveness regarding their exercise of their 
disciplinary powers against attorneys. The criticisms levelled against the Law 
Societies followed a request made by a columnist, Saunderson-Meyer, for access 
to the disciplinary records of attorneys. The information requested included the 
names of attorneys, the nature of disciplinary complaints against attorneys as 
 
 
125Ibid. 
126 See Saunderson-Meyer, William supra (n35). See also JH Jeffery, MP supra (n35). 
127Brümmer v Minister for Social Development 2009 (11) BCLR 1075 (CC). 
128 Section 16(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
129 Section 16(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
130Brümmer v Minister for Social Development supra (n127) at paras 62 – 63 
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well as the disciplinary findings made against attorneys. In his application, 
Saunderson-Meyer indicated that he required the information to make it 
available for public scrutiny. Saunderson-Meyer’s request was refused in that no 
response was given.131 
 
The Honourable Deputy Minister of Justice& Constitutional Development, JH 
Jeffery MP, when addressing the Annual General Meeting of the Kwa-Zulu 
Natal Law Society on 18 October 2018, stated that the Law Societies were the 
guardians of the Constitution and its values of transparency, openness and 
accountability, and that when these institutions failed to give access to the 
disciplinary records of attorneys requested by Saunderson-Meyer, they placed 
the “interests of legal practitioners above transparency” in contravention of the 
Constitution and its values.132 
 
Whilst the publication of the disciplinary records of legal practitioners could 
cause a reputational harm, the court in M & G Media Limited v 2010 FIFA World 
Cup Organising Committee South Africa Limited stated that access to 
information is a “tool of trade for journalists.” As such, it is important that 
journalists are granted access to information especially if the requested 
information is in the public interest. To enable journalists to perform their 
function of reporting to the public responsibly and accurately, it is important that 
they “have access to reliable sources of information” and would be able to 
successfully defend any “claim for damages” even if the information that has 
been published is inaccurate, if “they can show that publication … was 
reasonable”.133 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the Constitution which is founded on the 
values of accountability, transparency and openness, as well as the Bill of Rights 
which contains fundamental human rights including the right of access to 
 
 
131Saunderson-Meyer supra (n34). In terms of s 27 of PAIA, “if an Information Officer fails to give the 
decision on a request for access to information within the prescribed 30 day period, then such a request 
is deemed a refusal. 
132Jeffery, MP supra (n34). 
133M & G Media Limited v 2010 FIFA World Cup Organising Committee South Africa Limited 2011 (5) 
SA 163 (GSJ) at paras 343 to 344. 
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information and the right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom of 
the press and other media, as well as freedom to receive or impart information, 
were not in place when the Attorneys Act which created the Law Societies came 
was operational. As stated by Hoexter that, with the adoption of the Constitution 
and its recognition as the highest law, it became necessary for the legal 
profession as well as its regulation “to adapt to a new model of constitutional 
democracy”.134 
 
The LPA, which has replaced the Attorneys Act as from 1 November 2018 
embraces the founding values of the Constitution, namely, accountability, 
transparency and openness. The preamble of the LPA states as one of its 
objectives as being to “ensure that the values underpinning the Constitution are 
embraced and that the rule of law is upheld” and “to ensure the accountability of 
the legal profession to the public”, amongst the others. 
 
4. Distinction Between Public and Private Bodies 
 
 
Section 1 of PAIA defines a private body as a natural or partnership that conducts 
(or has conducted) any trade, business or profession and it includes a juristic 
person but excludes a public body. A public body is also defined in s 1 of PAIA 
to include national and provincial departments and municipalities, as well as any 
functionary or institution exercising a power or performing a duty in terms of the 
Constitution or a provincial constitution or exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of any legislation. Moreover, s 8 of PAIA 
states that any institution may be considered either a public body or a private 
body depending on whether the record in question relates to the exercise of a 
power or performance of a function by an institution as a public body or a private 
body. 135 
 
In the United Kingdom, access to information is regulated in terms of the 
provisions of FOIA. According to Holsen and Amos, FOIA is applicable only to 
 
 
134 Hoexter C “Administrative Action in the Courts” (2006) Acta Juridica 303. 
135 See Peekhaus op cit (n22) 575. 
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organizations that qualify as public as public bodies.136 A “public authority” for 
the purposes of the applicability of FOIA is defined in s 3 and it refers to 
“anybody which, any other person, or the holder of any office which is listed in 
schedule 1137, or is designated by an order under section 5138, or a public-owned 
company as defined in section 6”.139 Schedule 1 of FOIA lists bodies that are 
regarded as public authorities by name or type. According to Holsen and Amos, 
‘over 400 bodies are individually named’ in Schedule 1 of the Act. Furthermore, 
s 5 of FOIA empowers the secretary of the State to designate further bodies 
which appear to be exercising or performing public functions or are providing 
services to a public authority. 
 
Thus, in both jurisdictions, namely, South Africa and the United Kingdom, a 
fundamental question for determining the applicability of PAIA and FOIA, 
respectively, would turn on the question whether a body has exercised a public 
power or performed a public function in relation to the required information. 140 
Answering this question is vital in the determination of the applicability of the 
constitutional right of access to information through PAIA to the records of the 
LPC. It is also vital in the determination of the applicability of FOIA to the 
records of the Law Society of England and Wales in the United Kingdom. 
 
The phrases “public power” and “public function”, as important as they for 
determining the applicability of the constitutional right of access through PAIA, 
have not been defined in the South African Constitution and PAIA. The meaning 
of the phrase “functions of public nature” has also not been defined in FOIA. 
The court in the matter between Institute for Democracy in South Africa v The 
African National Congress stated that the considerations to be taken into account 
 
136S Holsen and J Amos ‘A Practical Guide to the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000’ October 2004, 
available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/political-science/publications/unit-publications/115.pdf, accessed on 
17 September 2018. 
137 Section 3(1)(a)(i) of FOIA. 
138 Section 3(1)(a)(ii) of FOIA. 
139 Section 3(1)(b) of FOIA. 
140 See Mittalsteel South Africa Limited v Hlatshwayo 2007 (1) SA 66 (SCA) at paras 10 and 12. See 
also M & G Media Limited v 2010 FIFA World Cup Organising Committee South Africa supra (n133) 
at para 149 and 150, Institute for Democracy in South Africa v The African National Congress 2005 (5) 
SA 39 (C) at paras 47-49. 
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to determine whether the exercise of power or the performance of a function is 
public or not include the source of the power, the nature of the power, its subject 
matter, whether it involves the exercise of a public duty.141 
 
Maripe mentions further that the test for the determination of whether the power 
is public or private 
‘usually combines a determination of the nature of the body itself, and the 
nature of the function it exercises. It seems therefore that a public body … must 
necessarily be set up to exercise some function with a public benefit or to 
discharge a public duty. The traditional tests used would be to enquire into the 
following: (a) the nature of the body (that is, how it is created or constituted); 
(b) the source of its powers (whether they derive from statute or some other 
source); (c) whether it falls under the control of a recognised public authority); 
(d) whether public money is one of the body’s sources of funding); (e) whether 
it is exercising some “governmental function”; and (f) whether its actions, 
decisions or its field of operations has implications for the public.”142 
 
The meaning of the phrases “performing a public function” and “the exercise of 
public power” have received further consideration by the court FIFA 2010 Local 
Organising Committee South Africa. The court stated that the considerations to 
be taken into account to determine whether a body is a public body or a private 
body include the composition of the body itself, specifically whether or not it 
includes officers of government; how the organization is funded, specifically 
whether public or state funds are used to fund the operations of the organization; 
the source of the power or function which must be a statute and whether the 
power is exercised in the public interest.143 
 
5. Is the LPC a Public or Private Body? 
 
 
Klaaren and Penfolf state that the court decisions on the meaning of an organ of 
state as defined in s 239 of the Constitution may be of assistance in addressing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141Institute for Democracy in South Africa v The African National Congress supra (n130) at para 44. 
142Maripe op cit (n26) 33-35. See also Hoexter op cit (n48) 4-5. 
143M & G Media Limited v 2010 Local Organising Committee South Africa supra (n133) at paras 239, 
245, 252, 258-260, 291 and 322. 
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this question144. The court in Hlatshwayo held that an organ of state as defined 
in s 239 ‘of the Constitution is essentially a ‘public body’.”.145 
 
As stated in Graham, the exercise of the LPC’s power of discipline against legal 
practitioners in terms of the LPA would be properly characterised as public in 
nature.146 Therefore, whilst the LPC is in terms of s 4 of the LPA established as 
a corporate body, it would be properly characterised as a public body in relation 
to the exercise of its disciplinary powers or performance of its disciplinary 
functions in terms of the LPA for the purposes of PAIA. This is so because the 
definition of a public body in s 1 of PAIA also takes a functional approach as 
opposed to an institutional approach particularly in regard to the institutions that 
are not government departments in the national, provincial or local sphere of 
government, where it is the nature of the power exercised or the function 
performed in relation to a record that is required that is decisive rather than the 
nature of the institution. Thus, the question whether the LPC is a public body or 
a private body as defined in s 1 of PAIA depends on the public nature or not of 
the power exercised or the function performed in relation to the record requested. 
 
The other consideration is the composition of the LPC. It comprises of not only 
legal practitioners but officers of government as well.147 The composition of the 
LPC indicates that it is a public body as stated in 2010 FIFA World Cup Local 
Organising Committee South Africa. 
 
According to Maripe, one of the considerations is whether an institution that is 
not a government department in the national, provincial or local sphere of 
government, falls under the control of a recognised public authority. The 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (“the Minister”) is 
empowered in terms of s 14 of the LPA to dissolve the LPC if he or she “loses 
 
144J Klaaren and G Penfold “Access to Information” Constitutional Law of South Africa [2nd ed – OS 
2002] 62 at 12, available at https://wiser.wits.ac.za/sites/default/files/chap62-63.pdf, accessed on 20 
April 2016. 
145Mittalsteel South Africa Limited v Hlatshwayo supra (n140) at para 8. See also M & G Media Limited 
v 2010 Local Organising Committee South Africa supra (n133) at para 142. 
146Graham v Law Society of the Northern Provinces supra (n78) at para 80. See also Law Society of the 
Northern Provinces v Le Roux supra (n91) at para 17. 
147Section 7(1) of the LPA. 
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confidence in the ability of the Council to perform its functions and efficiently 
…” The Minister is further empowered to prescribe the requirements of 
community service as part of practical vocational training of candidate legal 
practitioners.148 In addition, the LPC is required in terms of s 6(5)(h) of the LPA 
to report annually to the Minister on its operations. Thus, the LPC falls under the 
control of a recognised public authority, which is the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, hence in that regard it would be properly 
recognised as a public body as defined in s 1 of PAIA. 
 
The other consideration is the source of the LPC’s income to fund its operations. 
The source of LPC’s income for the funding of its operations comprises of 
subscriptions, fees, levies or other charges payable by legal practitioners149 . 
There is no provision for government to contribute to the funding of the 
operations of the LPC. It is financed by lawyers at no costs to the public or to 
government. 
 
As mentioned above that Schedule 1 to FOIA lists bodies that are recognised as 
public authorities and such organizations are listed by name or type. The Law 
Society of England and Wales is not among the types of bodies listed in Schedule 
1 of FOIA. Section 5 of FOIA empowers the Secretary of the State to designate 
further bodies that appear to be performing functions of public nature. Thus, s 5 
of FOIA also takes a functional approach as opposed to an institutional approach 
to determine institutions that qualify as public authorities, where it is the nature 
of the function that is performed that is decisive rather than the nature of the 
institution. The question whether the Law Society is a public authority has 
received consideration by the court in Law Society v Secretary of the State for 
Justice and held that it is not, but a private sector body.150 In its website, the Law 
Society of England and Wales states that it has voluntary chosen to subscribe to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
148Section 29 of the LPA. 
149Part II of the Rules for the South African Legal Practice Council. These Rules were published in the 
Government Gazette No. 41781, dated 20 July 2018. 
150Law Society v Secretary of the State for Justice (n30) at para 83. 
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the provisions of FOIA despite the provisions of this legislation being not 
applicable to it.151 
 
6. Applicability of PAIA to the LPC as a Public Body 
 
 
The applicability of PAIA to organizations that are regarded as public bodies as 
defined in s 1 of PAIA is regulated by s 11 of PAIA, read with the specific 
mandatory and discretionary exemption contemplated in Part 2 of Chapter 4 of 
PAIA. In terms of s 11 of PAIA, public bodies have an obligation to grant access 
to their records after compliance with all the prescribed procedural requirements, 
unless the record is exempted from disclosure in terms of one or more of the 
grounds of refusal set out in Part 2 of Chapter 4 of PAIA.152 It is bound by a 
constitutional obligation to conduct its operations transparently and accountably. 
Requests for access to the records of public bodies do not require any reason to 
be given to justify the request.153 The Constitutional Court in M & G Media Ltd 
held that the disclosure of information requested from a public body is a rule and 
that the refusal of the requested information on any one or more of the grounds 
of refusal set out in Part 2 of Chapter 4 of PAIA is an exception than a rule.154 
Thus the LPC, in the exercise of its disciplinary functions in terms of the LPA, 
is required to be transparent as possible about all the decisions and actions taken, 
including the reasons therefor, required in terms of both the Constitution and the 
provisions of s 11 of PAIA. 
 
In order facilitate access to information by the public in regard to the LPC’s 
exercise of its disciplinary powers against legal practitioners, s 38 of the LPA 
requires particulars of all disciplinary hearings, including the allegations of 
misconduct being dealt with; the name of legal practitioners involved; the 
outcome thereof and any sanction imposed following a disciplinary process 
 
 
151 Law Society of England and Wales, http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/get-in-touch/freedom-of- 
information/, accessed on 05 December 2015. 
152 See President of the Republic of South Africa v M & G Media Limited supra (n23) at para 59; My 
Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Another supra (n23) at para 23, 
Transnet Ltd v SA Metal Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd 2006 (6) SA 285 (SCA) at para 59. 
153 Section 11(3) of PAIA. 
154President of the Republic of South Africa v M & G Media Ltd supra (n23) at para 59. See also M & G 
Media Limited v 2010 FIFA Local Organising Committee South Africa supra (n133) at para 415. 
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against a legal practitioner to be published on the website of the LPC and to be 
made available for inspection by members of the public during business hours 
of the LPC and PCs. The publication policy enables the members of the public 
to make informed choices about whom among the lawyers to entrust with their 
legal matters. It helps maintain public confidence in the provision of legal 
services by legal practitioners. Indeed, it is in the public interest to publicise 
details and outcomes of complaints. Section 38 also provides for the disciplinary 
hearings to be open to the public, unless the chairperson of a disciplinary 
committee directs otherwise, on good cause shown, on application by a person 
having an interest in the matter. 
 
Indeed, the provisions of s 38 of the LPA give expression to the founding values 
of the Constitution as they are intended to create a culture of openness and 
accountability in the LPC’s exercise of its disciplinary functions in terms of the 
LPA by ensuring that the disciplinary decisions and any other information 
relating to the disciplinary processes of the LPC is available to the public. Having 
said that, it must be recognised that frivolous or fabricated complaints could 
damage the reputation, careers and businesses of legal practitioners. The right of 
legal practitioners to practise their chosen trade, occupation and profession, 
which is guaranteed in s 22 of the Constitution, may be adversely affected by the 
publication of frivolous or fabricated complaints. To address this concern, s 38 
of the LPA seems to permit publication and public examination of complaints 
against legal practitioners after finalisation of the investigation and disciplinary 
processes, however, this does not appear to be the case in regard to the 
disciplinary hearings which are open to the public unless on good cause shown 
the chairperson of a disciplinary committee otherwise after consideration of an 
application by a person having an interest in the matter. 
 
7. Applicability of PAIA to the LPC as a Private Body 
 
 
When the LPC’s exercise of powers or performance of functions in terms of the 
LPA is not public in relation to a record, the LPC will qualify as a private body 
as defined in s 1 of PAIA. Access to records of private bodies is regulated by s 
50 of PAIA. In addition to the prescribed procedural requirements, a requester 
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is required to show that a record is “required for the exercise or protection of any 
rights”. Additionally, the record required must not be subject to refusal under 
any of the mandatory or discretionary grounds of refusal set out in Part 3 of 
Chapter 4 of PAIA.155 A private body is allowed to refuse a request for access to 
its record on the basis that the request failed to meet the requirement in s 
50(10(a), namely that a record is required for the exercise or protection of any 
rights. In circumstances where a private body is unable to refuse a request for 
access to its record on this basis, it is allowed a further opportunity to consider 
whether any of the discretionary or mandatory grounds of refusal is applicable 
to a request. 
 
The meaning of the phrase “required for the exercise or protection of any rights” 
has been clarified in several court decisions. It was held in Claase v Information 
Officer, South African Airways (Pty) Ltd156 that a person seeking access to a 
record held by a private body is required to provide necessary information in his 
or her application which indicates the right the person wishes to exercise or 
protect157. In Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) the court stated that a 
requester should indicate specifically the right the requester wishes to exercise 
or protect; the information that is required and to explain how the required 
information would be of assistance to the person’s exercise or protection of his 
or her rights.158 It was held in Unitas Hospital that a requester who fails to 
provide the required information as stated above would not be entitled to receive 
the required record of a private body.159 
 
Thus, it is important for any person who requests access to a record of the LPC 
which does not relate to the exercise of powers or performance of functions of 
public nature in terms of the LPA not only to ensure compliance with the 
prescribed procedural requirements in s 50, but to provide the necessary 
information indicating specifically (a) the right the person wishes to exercise or 
protect; (b) the information that is required and (c) to explain how the required 
 
155 See Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk supra (n24) at para 17 
156Claase v Information Officer, South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2007 (5) 469 (SCA) 
157Claase v Information Officer, South African Airways (Pty) Ltd supra (n156) at para. 8. 
158Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) supra (n95) at para 28. 
159Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk supra (n24) at para 17. 
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information would be of assistance to the person’s exercise or protection of his 
or her rights, failing which the request may be refused. The SCA in Clutchco 
(Pty) Ltd v Davis confirmed that “required” means “reasonably required”, which 
in turn means that the requester must be able to show that he or she will accrue 
a ‘substantial advantage’ by accessing the record.160 The SCA in Unitas Hospital 
held that the question whether access to a record “is ‘required’ for the purpose of 
protecting or exercising the right concerned, can only be answered with reference 
of the facts’ of each case.161 
 
8. Application of Mandatory and Discretionary Grounds of Refusal of Access 
to Information 
 
Section 14 of the Constitution recognises and protects the right to privacy. 
Furthermore, s 36 of the Constitution allows the exercise of any right among the 
fundamental contained in the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution to 
be limited “in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation 
is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom taking into account all relevant factors including 
(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) 
the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relationship between the limitation 
and its purpose”.162 Therefore, the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution are not absolute as their exercise may be 
restricted in terms of the law of general application. 
 
PAIA provides for grounds of refusal of access to information in Part 2 of 
Chapter 4 in relation to records of public bodies. The grounds of refusal in 
relation to the records of private bodies are set out in Part 3 of Chapter 4 of PAIA. 
Some of the grounds are mandatory in the sense that the Information Officer of 
a public body or private body must refuse the request if one ground of refusal 
applies to a request for a record, whilst others are discretionary in the sense that 
the Information Officer may refuse the request. Robinson points out 
 
160 Clutchco (Pty) Ltd v Davis 2005 (3) SA 486 (SCA) at para 13. 
161Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk supra (n24) at para 18. 
162 Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
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that the grounds of refusal in Part 2 and Part 3 of Chapter 4 of PAIA could serve 
as a shield to avoid constitutional obligation of both public and private to be 
transparent and accountable about their operations.163 There is a possibility that 
discretionary powers could be misused. In that regard, any person who feels 
aggrieved by the exercise of discretionary powers is entitled to approach a court 
of law or an independent and impartial tribunal for an appropriate relief. 
 
The courts have, in their exercise of the power of review in terms of s 78 of 
PAIA164, and using the provisions of s 80165, held that reasons should be given 
to substantiate non-disclosure of the requested record on any one of the 
mandatory or discretionary grounds of refusal set out in Part 2 and Part 3 of 
Chapter 4 of PAIA. 
 
Section 81(3) of PAIA governs the onus of proof in all applications instituted 
under s 78 of PAIA. This section makes it clear that whenever a request for 
access is refused, the onus to show that the refusal is justified rests on the body 
that has refused the request. This is necessary because, as stated by the court in 
M & G Limited, the holder of the requested record is better placed to justify non- 
disclosure of the requested record than a requester who is not in possession of, 
and who does not have access to the required record.166 It was also held in M & 
G Limited that the giving of reasons will discourage abuse of mandatory and 
discretionary grounds of refusal set out in Part 2 and Part 3 of Chapter 4 of 
PAIA.167 
 
It is therefore important that when an application for access to any record of the 
LPC is refused, the ground of refusal among those set out in Part 2 and Part 3 in 
 
 
163RM Robinson Access to Information (2016) 82. 
164In terms of s 78 of PAIA, a requester who is not satisfied by the reasons given for the refusal of a 
request for access to information may “by way of an application” apply to court for appropriate relief. 
165 Section 80 of PAIA allows a court hearing an application to access any information that has been 
refused to decide whether the refusal is justified or not. It was held in President of the Republic of South 
Africa v M & G Limited supra (n23) at paras 52-53 that the purpose of s 80 of PAIA “is to test the 
argument for non-disclosure by using any record in question to decide the merits of the exemption 
claimed and the legality of the refusal to disclose the record. In this sense, it facilitates, rather than 
obstructs, access to information.” 
166President of the Republic of South Africa v M & G Limited supra (n23) at para 15. 
167President of the Republic of South Africa v M & G Limited supra (n23) at paras 52-53. 
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Chapter 4 of PAIA should be identified and a reason be given to justify non- 
disclosure of the required records based on the identified ground of refusal. The 
failure to give reasons for non-disclosure of the required record will be subject 
to review by a court in terms of s 78 of PAIA at the instance of the aggrieved 
requester. A court, in the exercise of its powers of review, may require access to 
the required record to determine whether non-disclosure is justified. For 
instance, in CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd v Fakie NO168 a requester was refused access 
to a record one the grounds of refusal recognised in Chapter 4 of PAIA. The 
court ordered the party from whom the record was requested to (a) provide all 
the documents and records in respect of which there was no objection to the 
requester, (b) provide a list of all the documents and records in respect of which 
access was refused and set out clearly and concisely (i) a description of the 
document or record, (ii) the basis for the objection, (iii) an indication whether or 
not the objection related to the whole document or only portion thereof and if so, 
(iv) to which portions. 
 
 
9. Third Parties ‘Access to the Records of the LPC 
 
 
The information in possession of the LPC, obtained during the investigation of 
a complaint against a legal practitioner and/or in the exercise of the LPC’s 
disciplinary functions, may include information that belongs to legal 
practitioners and complainants. This information may be the subject of a request 
by third parties in terms of the provisions of PAIA. The question is whether the 
LPC may allow third parties access to information in its possession which has 
been disclosed by legal practitioners and complainants. Stated differently, can 
the LPC use the information it has obtained from legal practitioners and 
complainants in the exercise of its disciplinary powers for any other purpose than 
the disciplinary investigation. There may be issues of legal professional privilege 
involved. In other words, the LPC may be in possession of communication 
between a legal practitioner and the complainant which may contain legal advice. 
 
 
 
168CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd v Fakie NO 2003 (2) SA 325 (T). 
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The issue received consideration by the Constitutional Court in Biowatch Trust 
v Registrar Genetic Resources.169 The Constitutional Court held that it is 
important for the holder of the record to deal with the request objectively and 
impartially. This requires that a decision of the holder of a record must not be 
aligned to the views of the person who furnished the information or a requester 
but that the holder of a record must make own independent assessment of the 
request and decision, considering whether there are issues of public interest 
involved.170 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
 
This Chapter examined the applicability of the constitutional right of access to 
information and the availability of a remedy of judicial review through PAIA for 
the exercise and enforcement of this right against the LPC’s records. The 
substantive requirements for the applicability of this right have been explained, 
namely, that the organization must be a public body or a private body. The 
distinction between a private body and a private body determines the 
requirements to be complied with for the exercise and enforcement of the 
constitutional right of access to information, hence it is fundamental when 
determining the applicability of the constitutional right of access to information 
and the availability of a remedy of judicial review for the enforcement of this 
right through PAIA. For instance, the exercise of the constitutional right of 
access to information against the records held by a public body is unqualified in 
the sense that a requester is not required to show that the record is required for 
the exercise or protection of any rights, whereas a requester of a record held by 
a private body is required to comply with this requirement in addition to the 
prescribed procedural requirements. 
 
It has been determined that the question whether the LPC is a public body or a 
private body depends on the nature of its powers or functions. If a record 
requested in terms of the provisions of PAIA relates to the LPC’s exercise of its 
 
 
169Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC). 
170Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources supra (n166) at para 45. 
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powers or performance of functions which are public in nature, then the LPC, 
whilst being a corporate body in terms of s 4 of the LPA, it will be regarded as a 
public body. 
 
The considerations for determining the public nature or not of the powers 
exercised or the functions performed in relation to a record sought in terms of 
the provisions of PAIA include the source of the powers or functions; the subject 
matter of the power exercised or function performed in relation to a record 
sought; the composition of the organization and its source of funding for its 
operations. 
 
This Chapter concludes that the LPC would be properly regarded as a public 
body in relation to a record that concerns the exercise of its disciplinary powers 
or functions in terms of the LPA. The other consideration which supports this 
conclusion is that the composition of the LPC includes officers of government. 
The LPC would be regarded as a private body in relation to a request for access 
to a record that does not involve the exercise of a power or performance of a 
function that is not public in nature. It would then become a question of whether 
the requester can show that the record is ‘required’ which means that the record 
will of assistance. 
 
This Chapter also explained the meaning of the additional requirement “required 
for the exercise or protection of any rights” which is applicable to requests of 
access to a record held by a private body. This requirement, as explained by the 
courts, requires a requester of access to a record of a private body to (a) indicate 
specifically a right a request wishes to exercise or protect; (b) provide an 
explanation of how the required record of a private body would be of assistance 
to the requester’s exercise or protection of his or her rights, failing which the 
requester would not be entitled to have access to the requested record of a private 
body. The requester would need to first receive and examine a record to 
determine if it will be of assistance. Therefore, it will be difficult for the request 
to comply with this requirement prior to the receipt and examination of the 
record. Thus s 32(1)(b) threshold requirement for a record to be “required for the 
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exercise or protection of any rights” is more stringent than the requirements of 
access to a record held by a public body. 
 
The application of the mandatory and discretionary grounds of refusal set out in 
Part 2 and Part 3 in Chapter 4 of PAIA has also been explained. The courts have 
held that reasons to justify non-disclosure of the requested record must be given 
to the requester. The refusal or non-disclosure of the requested record may be 
subject to a remedy of judicial review in terms of s 78 of PAIA at the instance of 
the aggrieved requester. In exercising its powers of review, the courts are in 
terms of s 80 of PAIA, also empowered to have access to the requested record 
and may order the holder of a record to (a) provide all the documents and records 
in respect of which there is no objection to access being granted to a requester; 
(b) provide a list of documents and records in respect of which access is refused 
and to set out clearly (i) a description of the document; (ii) the basis for the 
objection; (iii) an indication whether or not the objection relates to the whole 
document or only to a portion thereof, and if so, (iv) to which portions. By so 
doing, the courts are facilitating the realization and protection of the right of 
access to information. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
The dissertation has examined the applicability of the constitutional right to just 
administrative action and the availability of a remedy of judicial review, through 
PAJA, against the decisions of the LPC that are made in the exercise of its 
statutory powers and functions in terms of the LPA. The substantive 
requirements for the applicability of this right and for the availability of a remedy 
of judicial review against the decisions of the LPC were explained. These 
substantive requirements are that: (a) the organization must be subject to the 
provisions of PAJA and (b) that the decision must qualify as administrative 
action as defined in s 1 of PAJA. 
 
The dissertation has also examined the applicability of the constitutional right of 
access to information, through PAIA, to the records of the LPC. The substantive 
requirements for the applicability of this right have been explained, namely, that 
the organization must be a public body or a private body as defined in s 1 of 
PAIA. 
 
The application of the HRA and FOIA to the Law Society of England and Wales 
in the United Kingdom was used as the basis of comparison mainly because 
South Africa is one of the Commonwealth countries that apply English Law. 
Therefore, English Law can provide alternative available options that can be 
used for addressing identified legal obstacles so as to enhance South African law. 
 
2. LPC as an Organ of State for the purposes of PAJA 
 
 
The question examined in this dissertation was whether the LPC is organ of state 
which exercises a public power or performs a public function in terms of any 
legislation, or a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, which 
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exercising a public power or performs a public function in terms of an 
empowering provision. The conclusion reached after analysing relevant 
provisions of PAJA and case law, specifically Graham’s decision, is that the 
LPC is an organ of state when it exercises its disciplinary powers in terms of the 
LPA. Thus, the LPC will be subject to the provisions of PAJA as an organ of 
state when it exercises its disciplinary functions in terms of the LPA. 
 
3. Administrative Actions of the LPC 
 
 
The identified actions of the LPC that could possibly qualify as administrative 
actions as defined in s 1 of PAJA and therefore susceptible to judicial review 
where it is alleged that the constitutional right to just administrative action in s 
33 of the Constitution has been infringed include: (a) the failure to take 
disciplinary steps or a decision regarding complaints against legal practitioners; 
(b) failure or refusal to issue a legal practitioner with a Fidelity Fund Certificate 
(b) adverse disciplinary findings against legal practitioners other than the 
sanctions that may be imposed only by the courts such as suspension, interdict 
and removal of the legal practitioner’s name from the Roll of legal practitioners. 
These actions of the LPC are always lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair as 
required in terms of s 33(1) of the Constitution. This requires the LPC to ensure 
that these actions, which it is authorised by the law to take, are also justified in 
terms of reasons for its decision to be considered reasonable, and that the decision 
taken is proportional with reference to information at its disposal. To ensure that 
an administrative action is procedurally fair, there must be compliance with the 
requirements set out in s 3 of PAJA, some of which have been incorporated in 
the provisions of the LPA. Any decision of the LPC which does not meet the 
requirements of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness, as set out in 
s 33(1) of the Constitution; will be susceptible to judicial review on any one of 
the several grounds of review listed in s 6(2) of PAJA. 
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4. LPC as a Public Body or Private Body for the purposes of PAIA 
 
 
It has been determined in this dissertation that the question whether the LPC is a 
public body or a private body for the purposes of the application of PAIA 
depends on the public or private nature of the powers exercised in relation to the 
requested record. If a record requested in terms of the provisions of PAIA relates 
to the LPC’s exercise of its powers or performance of functions which are public 
in nature, then the LPC, whilst being a corporate body in terms of s 4 of the LPA, 
will be regarded as a public body. 
 
The considerations for determining the public nature or not of the powers 
exercised or the functions, performed in relation to a record sought in terms of 
the provisions of PAIA, as explained by the court in include the source of the 
powers or functions; the subject matter of the power exercised or function 
performed in relation to a record sought; the composition of the organization and 
its source of funding for its operations. 
 
This dissertation concluded that the LPC would be properly regarded as a public 
body in relation to a record that concerns the exercise of its disciplinary powers 
or functions in terms of the LPA. The other consideration which supports this 
conclusion is that the composition of the LPC includes officers of government. 
This means that the LPC, as a public body, would be duty bound to grant access 
to the requested record unless the request of access to a record can be defeated 
by one or more of the recognised mandatory or discretionary grounds of refusal 
in Part 2,Chapter 4 of PAIA. 
 
The LPC would be regarded as a private body in relation to a request for access 
to a record that does not involve the exercise of a power or performance of a 
function that is not public in nature. This means that a person seeking access to 
a record of the LPC as a private body would need to show that the information 
is required for the exercise or protection of rights. The meaning of the additional 
requirement “required for the exercise or protection of any rights”, which is 
applicable to requests of access to a record held by a private body, as explained 
by the courts, requires a requester to (a) indicate specifically a right a request 
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wishes to exercise or protect; (b) provide an explanation of how the required 
record of a private body would be of assistance to the requester’s exercise or 
protection of his or her rights, failing which the requester would not be entitled 
to have access to the requested record of a private body. 
 
5. Justification of Refusal of Requests for Access to Information 
 
 
The application of the mandatory and discretionary grounds of refusal set out in 
Part 2 and Part 3 in Chapter 4 of PAIA has also been explained. The courts have 
held that reasons to justify non-disclosure of the requested record must be given 
to the requester. The refusal or non-disclosure of the requested record may be 
subject to a remedy of judicial review in terms of s 78 of PAIA at the instance of 
the aggrieved requester. In exercising its powers of review, the courts are in 
terms of s 80 of PAIA, also empowered to have access to the requested record 
and may order the holder of a record to (a) provide all the documents and records 
in respect of which there is no objection to access being granted to a requester; 
(b) provide a list of documents and records in respect of which access is refused 
and to set out clearly (i) a description of the document; (ii) the basis for the 
objection; (iii) an indication whether or not the objection relates to the whole 
document or only to a portion thereof, and if so, (iv) to which portions. By so 
doing, the courts are promoting transparency, openness, accountability and 
openness in the operations of both private and public bodies. 
 
6. Legal Obstacles 
 
 
The dissertation has also identified certain legal obstacles that needs to be 
addressed so as to enhance accountability, transparency and openness of organs 
of state, private and public bodies, and also facilitate the exercise, realization and 
enforcement of the fundamental right of access to information in s 32 of the 
Constitution as well as the fundamental right to just administrative action in s 33 
of the Constitution by the ordinary people in South Africa without legal 
representation. The major obstacle identified herein concerns the meaning of a 
term “public”. The term “public” is significant in the determination of PAJA and 
PAIA. It is central in the determination of organizations that are organs of 
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state as defined in s 239 of the Constitution and those organizations that are not. 
It is significant in the determination of actions that fall within the definition of 
“administrative action” in s 1 of PAJA. An aggrieved person who cannot show 
that the conduct or act qualifies as administrative action as defined in s 1 of PAJA 
is not able to exercise the constitutional right to just administrative action. The 
term “public” also plays an important role in the determination of a distinction 
between a private body and a public body as defined in s 1 of PAIA. It is also 
critical in determinations of organisations that are public authorities for the 
applicability of both the HRA and FOIA in the United Kingdom. The 
Constitution, PAJA, PAIA, HRA and FOA all recognise that private bodies and 
public bodies can act in more than one capacity. In other words, the law in South 
Africa and in the United Kingdom recognise that, at times, a private body may 
exercise powers that are public in nature, and that public bodies may also at times 
exercise powers that are private in nature. Thus, the distinction between a private 
body and a public body has become blurred in terms of their definition in s 1 of 
PAIA, with the result that the distinction between a public body and a private 
body is not always clear cut as a private body can become a public body and a 
public body can also become a private body in certain circumstances, and this 
can be confusing to the requesters of information. 
 
However, the term “public”, as important as it is for the exercise, enforcement 
and protection of the constitutional right of access to information as well as the 
right to just administrative action, has not been defined in the Constitution, PAJA 
and PAIA. It has also not been defined in the HRA and FOIA. The Constitutional 
Court in Chirwa recognised the difficulty of determining what is public and not 
public for the purposes of the applicability of PAJA and PAIA. 
 
The legal obstacle that has been identified does not facilitate, but restricts the 
realization of accountability, transparency and openness required from both 
public and private bodies in the exercise of their powers and performance of their 
functions. If the nature of the power has been incorrectly determined, the 
required accountability, transparency and openness may potentially be 
undermined. The constitutional right to just administrative action as well as the 
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constitutional right of access to information may remain unfulfilled promises 
despite their recognition in the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
 
The judiciary, which is the guardian of the Constitution and its values and which 
is required in terms of s 39(1) of the Constitution to promote the values of the 
Constitution when interpreting any right in the Bill of Rights, has defined and 
explained the applicability of the right to just administrative action and the right 
of access to information. However, the courts’ interpretation and explanation of 
the applicability of these two fundamental rights have not been incorporated into 
the provisions of PAJA and PAIA. This does not make it easier for ordinary 
unsophisticated people to, on their own and without legal representation, 
exercise and enforce their constitutional right of access to information and the 
right to just administrative action. 
 
A remedy of judicial review is available for the enforcement and protection of 
the constitutional right to just administrative action and the constitutional right 
of access to information. Thus, these two constitutional right are justiciable in 
the sense that the aggrieved person, that is a person who feels that his or her 
rights have been violated, is entitled to approach a court or any other independent 
and impartial tribunal for appropriate relief, which may only be granted if a 
violation of any right has been found to have occurred. Despite the justiciability 
of the right of access to information and the right to just administrative action, 
many people who are living in poverty are less likely to have the means and 
resources to approach the courts for judicial enforcement and protection of these 
rights. As pointed out by Hoexter, not everyone has the financial resources to 
litigate and many potential applicants are prevented by this requirement from 
challenging decisions in a court of law, hence only a small proportion of 
decisions are challenged in court. 
 
7. Recommendations 
 
 
It is recommended that, in order to enhance responsiveness, openness and 
accountability in South Africa, both PAJA and PAIA be amended to incorporate 
the guidelines developed by the courts to determine when the power or function 
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would be considered public for the purposes of the application of these two 
statutes. Furthermore, the approach in the United Kingdom listing the public 
authorities by name or type be adopted, and that the functions which are 
considered to be in the public interest when they are performed by institutions in 
terms of legislation be included in the proposed list. The list of companies that 
are considered to be public and the functions considered to be performed in the 
public interest do not have to be exhaustive but should be given as examples. 
 
The proposed amendments to legislation are necessary particularly in light of the 
fact that the applicants for judicial review and access to information are required 
to establish that the requirements for the application of PAJA and PAIA, 
respectively, to the private institutions, as set out by the courts, are all met, failing 
which they would not be entitled to the required relief. 
 
These proposed amendments would facilitate the enjoyment of the constitutional 
rights to administrative justice that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
enshrined in s 33 of the Constitution, and the constitutional rights of access to 
information enshrined in s 32 by all people, specially unsophisticated persons 
who may not have the resources or means to easily use the legal mechanisms 
created by PAJA and PAIA. 
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